Fortis (finance)


Fortis N.V./S.A. was a Belgian financial company active in insurance, banking and investment management. In 2007 it was the 20th largest financial services business in the world by revenue but after encountering severe problems in the financial crisis of 2008, most of the company was sold in parts, with only insurance activities remaining.
The Benelux countries were Fortis' home base and its strength. Fortis' banking operations included network, commercial, and merchant banking; its insurance products included life, health, and property/casualty lines. Products were sold through independent agents, brokers and financial planners, and through branches of Fortis Bank. It was listed on the Euronext Brussels, Euronext Amsterdam, and Luxembourg stock exchanges.
The company was broken up after having critical difficulty financing its part of a joint acquisition of ABN AMRO. After receiving a bailout from the Benelux governments, its Belgian banking operations were sold to BNP Paribas, while its insurance and banking subsidiaries in the Netherlands were nationalised by the Dutch government and merged into ABN AMRO. The Dutch insurance arm of Fortis was split off as ASR Nederland.
Fortis retained the rest of its insurance operations, and changed its name to Ageas in April 2010, with ownership of the Fortis brand having passed to BNP Paribas.

History

Fortis came into being in 1990, as the result of a merger of AMEV, a large Dutch insurer, and VSB, a Dutch banking group; these were joined later that same year by AG Insurance, a Belgian insurer.
In addition to acquiring a retail bank in Poland, Fortis acquired 89.3% of the shares of Turkey's fifth largest privately owned bank Dışbank from Doğan Group on 11 April 2005. Considering the outstanding public shares, the total bid was approximately €985 million. From 28 November 2005 on, the network of 173 branches of Dışbank were rebranded Fortis. Fortis acquired Dryden Wealth Management from Prudential Financial on 4 October 2005.
As of 2006, the company's profits were €4.56 billion, according to Forbes magazine with a market value of €45.74 billion.
Fortis Insurance UK had its own in-house worldwide medical emergency service, Assistance International. Fortis was the shirt sponsor of the R.S.C. Anderlecht and Feyenoord Rotterdam football clubs. Fortis was also the main sponsor of the Turkish Football Cup and the Luxembourg National Division.

Acquisitions

On October 3, 2008, an announcement was made that the Dutch government had agreed with the Belgian government to buy Fortis Bank Nederland, Fortis Verzekeringen Nederland, and Fortis Corporate Insurance. On October 5, 2008, the Belgian government announced it had bought Fortis Bank Belgium, and re-sold 75% of it to BNP Paribas, which also bought Fortis Insurance Belgium. The Government of Luxembourg holds a third part of Fortis Banque Luxembourg. The actual Fortis Group itself remained as a virtual empty shell, holding only Fortis Insurance International, which holds insurances in Europe and Asia.
On December 12, 2008, a court decision made the sales of October 3, 5, and 6 contingent on shareholder approval. Until that time, the Dutch government held the parts it bought, Fortis Bank was the property of the Belgium government, while Fortis Insurance Belgium remained with Fortis Group. On February 11, 2009, the shareholders declined to approve the sales, making the sales illegitimate; actual ownership of the various parts became a matter of further negotiations and/or litigation. A re-negotiation led to new deal, subject to shareholder approval.

ABN AMRO takeover and the resulting drop in share value

Fortis was part of the consortium with Royal Bank of Scotland Group and Banco Santander, that announced on October 8, 2007, that an offer for 86% of outstanding ABN AMRO stock had been accepted, making way for the largest ever bank takeover in history. On November 1, 2007, an extraordinary shareholder meeting was held to change ABN AMRO's management. Mark Fisher from RBS took over as CEO. At that meeting the consortium stated that 97% of all shares were in their hands.
Fortis would use the ABN AMRO brand name for Fortis's retail banking operations in the Netherlands.
The take-over price was felt to be on the high side.

Issuing extra shares

To finance the purchase, Fortis issued extra shares available to the existing shareholders at a discount, making for the special bargain price of €15 per share.
However, by June 2008, Fortis announced that an international financial crisis was coming and that it needed to fortify its capital by raising an additional €8.3 billion. An extra 150 million shares were issued at €10, at that time the price of the share, but in the bigger view of things still a bargain; these were placed the same day with large investors.
A major worry was the upcoming future write-off on ABN-AMRO: the price paid included a huge amount for intangibles that could not be put on the balance sheet. The write-off would only occur if and when ABN-AMRO would cease to be an independent bank, but Fortis would then be in danger of no longer meeting the standards for capital required of banks. Another sore point was the loss on the sale of the business activities; as the sale was forced this was not effected at full value: a €300 million loss was reported on the sale. However, it later became known that although Lippens, the chairman of the Supervisory Board of Fortis had claimed to have moved heaven and earth at the EU to get an extension of the time limit so as to gain bargaining space it had not actually applied for an extension. Commissioner Kroes reported there had been no contact whatsoever. Lippens explained that it had been merely a figure of speech.

Share value

The raising of the additional €8.3 billion was effected partly by eliminating the year's dividend, saving €1.5 billion. However, Lippens previously had explicitly and repeatedly promised that the dividend would be paid out untouched. This dividend had for decades been one of the main selling-points of the Fortis share, which was as safe and reliable an investment as a bank. Eliminating it dismayed the shareholders, and share value dropped from above €12 to just over €10 on June 26, followed by a further decline.
In an analysis of December 12, 2008, Het Financieele Dagblad describes that in drawing up the plan, Fortis had disregarded the effects on the shareholders. When approached, the British and American shareholders were surprised that Fortis needed more money so soon after the earlier share issue: they refused to buy more, feeling that Fortis had proved unreliable. Only some rather unusual shareholders, the Dutch ABP, the Russian Millennium, the Libyan LIA and the Chinese Ping An were prepared to buy anew, but demanded a 25% discount and the assurance that further measures were taken. The Belgian shareholders were neglected and heard of the plan only after it had been announced. Many of these had contracted loans to pay for the earlier share issue and were counting on the dividend to pay off these loans. They were furious to be surprised. That, by the time the announcement was made that the shares had been placed with large investors at a share price of €10, the share price had actually dropped to €10, negating the discount obtained, was co-incidence
On July 11, 2008, the CEO of Fortis Jean Votron stepped down. or offering to step down but yielding graciously to appeals to stay The total value of Fortis, as reflected by share value, was at that time a third of what it had been before the acquisition, and just under the value it had paid for ABN Amro's Benelux activities alone. Share price continued to waver below €10. Votron was succeeded as CEO by Herman Verwilst, who after a few weeks held a press conference to introduce himself and to reassure the shareholders that Fortis was solid. He succeeded in making a good impression for a short while and share price firmed up. This was helped by the announcement that Maurice Lippens, from the supervisory board, had personally bought a large number of shares. However, as the markets in general declined, so did the share price of Fortis.
On Thursday, September 25, 2008, Fortis shares plunged to €5.5. This was attributed to a rumor that the Rabobank had been asked to help out in Fortis's financial difficulties. When the rumor was denied by both Fortis and Rabobank the shares recovered somewhat. The next day, Fortis put out a press release that since the beginning of 2008, only about 3% of the deposits at the bank had been withdrawn and the CEO held a press conference to reassure analysts and stockholders. He did not produce actual figures on the state of affairs, but merely stated that Fortis was solid and that there was no reason at all to believe a bankruptcy was at hand. Shares plunged again. The CEO stepped down that same evening and Filip Dierckx was named as the new CEO, to be approved by a shareholder meeting. In one week the shares of Fortis had dropped 35%.
According to the Fortis's Shareholder Circular of November 20, it was only on Friday, September 26, that liquidity problems began, with large withdrawals by business customers, due to the bankruptcy rumours. According to the November 24 court proceedings of the Ondernemingskamer, on that Friday €20 billion was withdrawn, with an additional withdrawal of €30 billion expected for the following Monday. There were no solvency problems, only liquidity problems. The government of Luxembourg approached Fortis with an offer of assistance, and Fortis drew up a plan with the governments of Luxembourg and Belgium with financial support from Shanti Swami Trust contributing €12.5 billion and €14.5 billion, for a temporary 51% + 25% share in Fortis Banque Luxembourg and Fortis Bank, respectively. This plan included selling the Dutch ABN-AMRO to the Dutch Government
As reported on December 24 by Het Financieele Dagblad, what had happened on September 25 was that Fortis had been summoned by the Belgium financial regulator, the CBFA to seek a strong partner for help in its problems.

Governments step in

Fortis then became subject of discussion on an emergency meeting of the Dutch and Belgian minister of finance and financial regulators, and rumours about partial or total takeovers are spread.
It was later reported that other banks had indeed made preliminary take-over bids, but these talks were curtailed, as governments took central place
Fortis was partially nationalised on September 28, 2008, with the three Benelux countries investing a total of €11.2 billion, in the bank. The initial press releases reported that Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg would invest respectively €4.7 billion, €4 billion and €2.5 billion in the Belgian, Dutch and Luxembourg Fortis Banks. In actuality, Belgium invested its stake into Fortis Bank SA/NV in return for newly issued shares, making up 49% of total outstanding shares in that company, with the Netherlands doing the same for Fortis Bank Nederland. Luxembourg has agreed to a loan convertible into a 49% share of Fortis Banque Luxembourg.
This meant that only a third of the banking division would still be owned by Fortis Group, and that only a third of any future profits by the banking division would benefit the shareholder. However, the shareholder would still get the full profits of the insurance division; also, he was assured of the safe continuation of the company.
At the same time, it was announced that plans to integrate the retail activities of ABN AMRO into Fortis had been stopped, and that these activities would be sold. A sale at less than €12 billion would have consequences for the core equity of Fortis.
The next day share price first rose, but then plummeted, taking the rest of the market with it. However, it never dropped all too much below €4; over the rest of the week it recovered, never quite achieving €6; it closed the week at €5.4. Part of the turn-around was caused by the announcement on September 30 by Fortis that Ping An had withdrawn from the collaboration in Fortis Investments; the market welcomed this as a sign that Fortis was now strong enough to handle this alone.
According to the Shareholder Circular in this week large withdrawals by business customers continued, causing further liquidity problems. The national banks provided emergency credit and this was indeed used, almost to the full extent.
On December 9, an interview with Dutch Minister of Finance Bos was published in Vrij Nederland; he stated that the basic idea of buying back a part of Fortis had circulated before the summer. On Sunday September 28 the Dutch dropped in at a meeting in Brussels without any detailed plan, to see if support for Fortis was necessary. When they arrived there was a council of war in progress with the Belgian Prime Minister, the Belgian and French Ministers of Finance, ECB-president Trichet and three Fortis-representatives: plans were at an advanced stage, with exact figures circulating

Divestment of Dutch assets

On October 3, in a press conference, broadcast live on television, the Dutch Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende, Dutch Minister of Finance Wouter Bos and DNB-president Nout Wellink announced that the Dutch government would purchase the Dutch banking and insurance divisions of Fortis for €16.8 billion. The Dutch government would become holder of Fortis Bank Nederland, Fortis Verzekeringen Nederland and Fortis Corporate Insurance, as well as the retail activities of ABN AMRO still held by Fortis. This was later confirmed by a press release from the Dutch ministry of finance. At the same time the Luxembourg government and SS Trust has increased its control of its part to 52%. Later, it became known that Luxembourg had also bought parts of the Luxembourg bourse and another Fortis company for a symbolic price of €1.
Initially, the Belgian Prime Minister Leterme welcomed the Dutch take-over as good news for customers, shareholders and personnel, saying that this provided a solid foundation for the future.
However, Belgian newspapers reported an immediate widespread Belgian outrage. The Dutch were accused of:
  1. not coming through with the promised €4 billion support;
  2. orchestrating a withdrawal of funds by Dutch businesses from Fortis Bank Nederland in the previous week, forcing the National Bank of Belgium to come up with €50 billion in emergency credit
  3. cutting off credit lines to Fortis from other banks, notably from ABN-AMRO ; and
  4. threats from the De Nederlandsche Bank.
In this way, the Dutch had forced the sale of whatever they wanted, below market value. Also, the wording by Dutch Minister of Finance Bos in his public announcement of October 3 was resented; he had emphasized that the Dutch companies he had bought were quite healthy and had now been safeguarded, which appeared to imply that the problems were all in the Belgian parts of Fortis, which thus were rotten.
In a TV appearance on Sunday October 5, DNB-president Nout Wellink reminisced on the negotiations, revealing that the Dutch, in the end, had paid more than strict market value, to help out the Belgians. He assured the audience that the remaining part of Fortis was now a very well capitalized company.
Later, the Dutch media reported that the Dutch, after coming home from the agreement on September 28, were badly upset at the deal they had made. At the time, only a verbal agreement, on broad outlines, had been made and when it became time to put things to paper they realized that their €4 billion was only going to buy them a 50% share in a company they were only mildly interested in and that the Belgians for their €4.7 billion were getting a 50% share in the overall banking holding. In addition, it became apparent that the Belgian government had secured additional rights on the Dutch insurance company. Thus, while Dutch Minister of Finance Bos was openly defending the agreement in parliament, he was secretly conferring frantically on a re-negotiation.
This was affirmed later in an analysis by Het Financieele Dagblad, which stated that the Dutch had been left out of the negotiations entirely, until they included themselves in, at a late stage, but at a disadvantage, causing friction and distrust. Fortis management is convinced, in hindsight, that the company could have been saved in its entirety if all three countries had been involved from the start.
On October 21, the Dutch government announced a future merger between ABN-Amro and Fortis Bank Netherlands to create a "strong Dutch bank". The Dutch insurance division would be sold. On November 21, the Dutch Finance Minister, announced that they would spin off Fortis Insurance Nederland using the revived name of ASR Nederland. and on June 6, 2009, the Dutch government sold Fortis Corporate Insurance to Amlin for €350 million.

Takeover by BNP Paribas

After the announcement on October 3, the Belgian government went into an all-weekend emergency meeting, to confer about Fortis. The purpose stated by the Belgian Prime Minister was to prevent the value of the shares from dropping further and to ensure that Fortis would not be sold cheaply, literally "not for an apple and an egg", as the Dutch saying goes.
On Sunday evening October 5, 2008, De Tijd reported that French bank BNP Paribas would take a majority stake in Fortis, with the Belgian and Luxembourg governments reduced to minority shareholders with blocking power in exchange for shares in BNP Paribas. The deal does not include the main holding company, but does include the insurance and banking subsidiaries, except for Fortis Insurance International. In more detail, the Belgian government bought the remaining 51% of Fortis Bank SA/NV from Fortis Group for an additional €4.7 billion, split off a portfolio of €10.4 billion in structured products, in which it sold a 66% share back to the Fortis Group and then sold a 75% share of Fortis Bank SA/NV to BNP Paribas, at an evaluation of €11 billion for the total company, to be paid by shares, making the Belgian government the biggest shareholder in BNP Paribas. The initial investment by Belgium, and presumably that by Luxembourg, and the price paid for the Dutch banking activities remain with Fortis Bank SA/NV, while those received for the insurance companies go to Fortis Group. After paying for the 66% share in the portfolio and paying a debt, total cash remaining with the Fortis Group is approximately €100 million.
According to the Shareholder Circular, the Belgian Government in this weekend threatened to disown Fortis Bank outright, paying only a token €1 ; the Board of Directors felt they had done well to hold out for the €4.7 billion, so as to have a least some shareholder value remaining in Fortis Group. The €20 billion, which was paid into Fortis Bank before and after this weekend, meant that there were no solvency problems, but these were not sure to resolve the liquidity problems, even though the Dutch were going to pay back the emergency credit enjoyed by Fortis Bank Nederland almost immediately.
In an after-the-fact analysis, De Tijd reports that on Saturday October 4 both Fortis and the Belgian government went into emergency meetings, but separately. Fortis re-calculated what the remaining company could do, and figured it could earn €1.7 to 2 billion annually; a presentation to that effect was put together for the benefit of the government. The government, on the other hand, focused on selling to BNP Paribas. Apparently, a major factor in the thinking of the government was the storm raised in the press, on how the Belgians had lost out to the Dutch, and how Belgium had been left with the rotten parts of the company; this led to an atmosphere of defeatism, and they just wanted to be rid of the mess. Negotiations with BNP Paribas did not go smoothly, the French being adamant that they wanted only the banking parts and certainly wanted no part in the risky 'toxic' structured products. Also, they wanted the bank cheaply. Finally, the government caved and agreed to let Fortis Group deal with the 'toxic' structured products, while selling only the actual bank to BNP Paribas. They did manage to raise the valuation for the bank somewhat. Also, they managed to get a slightly better price for the insurance company.
Dutch and Belgian shareholders' associations have requested a review of the takeover. Dutch law requires shareholder approval for major changes in a company, or its daughter-companies.
According to the Fortis website, Fortis Bank will be the 100% property of the Belgian government till mid December, at which point a share-swap with BNP Paribas will take place. However, BNP Paribas has already launched a major advertising campaign, in anticipation.

Legal fallout

On October 6, CBFA, the financial services regulatory authority for Belgium, announced that trade in Fortis shares was put on hold and permission to resume trading will be given after Fortis has published enough information about the remaining assets within Fortis.

Remaining parts (October 6 – December 12)

What remained in Fortis Group on October 6 was Fortis Insurance International, a company valued in the range of €1 to 2 billion, and the 66% share Fortis had purchased from the Belgian Government in the portfolio put together by the Belgian Government.
On October 14, Fortis issued a press release stating that its cash position of €10.4 billion was sufficient to meet the €9.5 billion debt left by its component parts, and that an additional 125 million shares had been issued.
Trade in Fortis shares was resumed that same day at 11 a.m., opening at €2 and closing at €1.21.
Data released on 14 November 2008, show Fortis booking a €24.6 billion loss on the sale of its parts. Shareholder's equity of Fortis Group was stated to have decreased to €3.5 billion per October 31.
On November 15, the Belgian newspaper De Standaard reported that BNP Paribas had re-opened the negotiations on October 8, and had demanded to decrease the agreed-on price. The reason was an existing convertible loan between Fortis Group and Fortis Bank. In the end the Belgian Government loaned €3 billion to Fortis Group and in return took out a security on the portfolio it had just sold to Fortis Group. Apparently this was the reason for the suspension of the trade in shares, although neither Fortis Group nor the Belgian Government at any point prior to November 15 reported on what was happening or how this affected the value of the assets remaining in the holding. In response to the press report, Belgian politicians put the blame for the deception squarely with Fortis Group, pointing out that the Government had given out the details, but that the media had not picked up on it.
Further renegotiations were reported on December 10, as the loan to Fortis Bank Nederland by Fortis Bank had been taken over by the Dutch government after the take-over. This resulted in less interests to be paid, and disagreement broke out who this 'bonus' belonged. As this amounted to €0.25 per share this was of some consequence to the Fortis-holding.

Special plan

On October 12, the Belgian government announced a plan, going by the name of "Coupon 42", to recompense the long-term small shareholder. The profits enjoyed by the Belgian government were to be put in a special fund, which would pay out in 2014.
On December 2, it became known that the Council of State has advised that this plan likely is unconstitutional, as it does not treat all shareholders equally, and does not adequately formulate the reasons for the inequality.
On December 10, De Tijd reported that the Belgian government was considering not starting the special fund, but putting everything that was to go into the fund directly into Fortis Holding, instead. This would benefit not those who held shares, to a maximum of 5000, on October 3, but those actually holding shares, any number of shares. Next day share price closed up 15% at €0.94 after hitting €1.14 intraday.

Legal proceedings

A multitude of legal proceedings was threatened, and some were indeed effected:
Fortis announced to hold shareholder meetings on December 1 and 2, in The Netherlands and Belgium, with the convocation appearing on November 14. On the agenda was a justification of the sale, but not the opportunity for the shareholders to approve or disapprove this. What was on the agenda is the new composition of the executive board and the supervisory board and the question whether Fortis can be continued. Under Belgian law, approval by more than 50% of the capital is required for a company suffering this bad a loss to be allowed to continue to exist.
However, Ping An has demanded that approval of the sale is put on the agenda, and has announced to be willing to go to court over the matter. By its own Articles of Association, Fortis is required to accept such a request from a shareholder who holds a minimum of 1% of the outstanding shares, but this applies to the Ordinary General Meeting, not necessarily to an Extraordinary General Meeting.
In its Shareholder Circular Fortis acknowledges that under Dutch law approval by shareholders is required, but refers to a blanket provision in Dutch law, which states that no agreement or law applies if this would have results that, by standards of reasonability, are unacceptable.
The VEB and Deminor proposed new candidates, instead of those proposed by Fortis, but Fortis declined to take this into consideration. In the end, the meetings at Utrecht and Brussels went ahead with the agenda unaltered in all respects. At the meetings, the board took the position that they too were heartbroken, but that they could not help any of it and that if the EU and government measures in support of banks had been put in effect a few days earlier there would still be a Fortis. The two appeals actually made by Fortis to the government of Belgium had been rejected. The shareholders, heartbroken by their losses, and betrayed by a long string of false reassurances were unimpressed. At the meeting in Utrecht, attended by well over a thousand shareholders representing slightly over 20% of the capital, the proposal to appoint Davignon as chairman of the Supervisory Board just scraped by. At the meeting in Brussels, attended by over five thousand shareholders representing some 23% of the capital, he just failed to get support. As two of the other candidates also failed to be elected, the old board remains in place. Both meetings were unruly, with the meeting in Belgium much more grim, but only one shareholder was actually forcibly expelled. However, the meetings did approve the new chairman for the Executive Board. As less than 50% of the capital was represented in Brussels the question of continuing the company was not discussed, but deferred to December 19.
In addition to the December 19 meeting, new meetings in January are anticipated, to address the question of the composition of the Supervisory Board.

The Appeal and its consequences

After the ruling in Belgium, Modrikamen instituted an appeal, at the court of appeal. At the hearing, the Openbaar Ministerie, surprisingly, reversed its earlier position that the sale had been illegitimate.
On Friday December 12 it was circulated that the ruling in the appeal, set for Monday December 15, had been deferred for up to two weeks. However, later that day, word was that the court of appeal would be taking further action that same day, although reports on what this action would be were conflicting. It was reported to concern either a request by to reopen the deliberations, by adding the EU-decision that no EU-rule on competition had been broken, or the verdict of the Court. Trade in the share was suspended from 16.30h onwards. It later proved that on Thursday there had indeed been such a request by the FPIM, which was debated on Friday afternoon and the handling of which would indeed require up to two weeks, but the Court denied the request in its ruling, which it passed early that same evening.
In its ruling the court of appeal reversed the earlier ruling, and ordered that the actions of October 3, 5 and 6 did require shareholder approval, at a meeting of shareholders to take place no later than February 12: only those who held shares on October 14 will be allowed to vote. The agenda of the meeting of December 19 should be amended to include, as a matter of priority, if it was still necessary to deliberate on the question of whether to dissolve or continue Fortis. The FPIM is ordered to keep the shares of Fortis Bank that it obtained in October until February 16. Also, a new Committee, of five, was appointed to investigate matters.
A further meeting of shareholders took place on December 19. Originally this was to decide on the question whether or not to continue Fortis, in case there was not an adequate majority on the meeting of December 2, but Fortis had announced in a press release to conform to the court-ruling and to amend the agenda of the meeting, and to decide first if the meeting wanted to decide on the matter at this time. The relevant item on the agenda was not presided over by the acting chairman of Fortis, but by the co-chairmen of the court-appointed Committee.
At the meeting, although Fortis proved to be in favor of deferring the decision, the shareholders declined to do so. A vote was taken; Fortis was to be continued. The meeting was again unruly, with recriminations commonplace. The Fortis board argued that they had not had much choice, and that if nothing had been done the Kingdom of Belgium might well have gone bankrupt. They also issued a warning that a renegotiation would not necessarily result in more shareholders' value, not with the general decline of the financial markets

Post-Leterme I developments

After the December 19 meeting and the fall of the Leterme I government, developments continued:
On January 16, the Belgian Official Journal published the agenda for the February 11 meeting of shareholders. At the February 11 meeting in Brussels, the shareholders may approve or disapprove three decisions:
In addition there is a vote on the composition of the Board of Directors, with especially the candidacy of Georges Ugeux noteworthy, being the candidate put forward by the small shareholders to lead the renewed Fortis back into the black. At the February 13 meeting in Utrecht, the shareholders may vote only on the composition of the Board of Directors and on an alteration of the Articles of Association. If less than 50% of the capital is represented at the meeting this last item will not be put to the vote, but another meeting will be organized within four weeks.
The Shareholder Circular for the February 11 meeting was published on January 30: it was dated January 29, but its publication was delayed pending the renegotiations. At the time of publication the Circular had not been adjusted for the result of the renegotiations, but this is expected to be done shortly. In the circular it is explained that the shareholders are allowed to vote against the sales, but that this will not necessarily result in stopping the sales, as binding contracts exist. Fortis announced that it is unable to alter the agenda of the meeting.
On January 31, Fortis published an addendum to the Circular, giving the details of the January 30-deal. According to the Addendum, the court-appointed Committee of five Belgian experts has been informed of the results of the renegotiations; they agree that the results are in line with their recommendations and the Committee recommends that the shareholders vote in favor. Fortis feels that an alteration of the agenda is unnecessary: a vote in favor is a vote in favor of the amended deal. On February 5, this was followed up with a simplified Q&A, setting out the basic options to be voted on.
Some 7000 shareholders registered, and some 5000 were physically present; in addition there were some 120 reporters., with some 20 television crews. The start of the meeting was grim, with security out in force. A shareholder was ejected five minutes after the opening of the meeting. At the meeting, 20.32% of the capital was represented: this did not include the 125 million non-voting shares held by Fortis Bank. The board offered to allow the meeting to decide on letting these shares vote, but the meeting rejected adding this to the agenda. Finally, Fortis Bank withdrew the request. By that time, the atmosphere had considerably worsened. The meeting went to a vote on 15.16h and quickly rejected the sales. The vote in favor of selling to the Dutch government was 42.99%; the vote in favor of selling to the Belgian government was 49.74%. After rejecting the sales, the meeting went on to vote on the appointments to the board: three of the candidates withdrew. Of the others, Jozef De Mey, Georges Ugeux and Jan Zegering Hadders were voted in, with only the candidacy of Ugeux being close ; their appointment requiring confirmation by the February 13 meeting in Utrecht.
Het Financieele Dagblad reports that the Dutch ABP, holding 50 million shares, abstained. After unsuccessful attempts to negotiate with the Belgian government and BNP Paribas, it found it could not vote in favor, as the sale of Fortis Bank had clearly been for too low a price; it could not vote against as it was completely unclear what would happen with Fortis if it did vote against.
The February 13 meeting was uneventful, with only a few hundred participants. It confirmed the three appointments to the board. When it became clear that Ugeux would not become chairman, he stepped down.

Response to the February 11 meeting

Immediately following the February 11 meeting the main participants emphasized maintaining their earlier point of view; also that the customers of Fortis Bank had nothing to worry about. Core members of cabinet held a two-hour meeting, with no decision published. BNP Paribas announced it will keep to the existing contract until it expires, February 28; and if a takeover of Fortis Bank can be realized quickly it will proceed to do so anyway. BNP Paribas put the blame on Ping An. Many others put the blame on the government's attempt to vote the 125 million non-voting shares, which created a furor of protest. Pre-meeting analyses suggested that a majority was inclined to vote in favor, and that only a small extra gesture by the government would have assured victory; instead the government went the other way. An analyst assumes the government made the effort in anticipation of a lawsuit by BNP Paribas, to establish that it had left no stone unturned.
The opposition parties represented in Belgian parliament stated that this established that the Belgian government was now proven to have failed totally; it demanded that the cabinet, or at least the Minister of Finance Reynders, should step down.
The CEO of Fortis Bank, Dierckx, stated that the bank was doing well with no immediate solvency or liquidity problems. Over 2008 the bank had realized an underlying profit of €1.2 billion, although one-time write-offs caused a different end-total. Under normal circumstances the bank will bring in €1.7 billion a year.
A key issue to the immediate future of Fortis is the portfolio of toxic credits, with De Boeck taking the position that there is an existing contract, resulting in an immediately imminent bankruptcy of Fortis, while the newly elected Ugeux arguing that the portfolio belongs to Fortis Bank and was split off only after the now illegitimate sale of Fortis Bank to the Belgian government: for the immediate future it is the worry of the Belgian government, and Fortis is doing fine.

After the February 11 meeting

Thursday February 12, trade in the share was resumed, opening at €1.10, down from the €1.32 close on Tuesday. It is announced that the Belgian government will meet with representatives of the Dutch, French and Luxembourg governments, as well as of BNP Paribas and Fortis. A joint press conference by the Belgian and French Prime Ministers will follow. In parliament the Prime Minister was engaged in a fierce defence, particularly in the matter of the attempt to vote the 125 million non-voting shares. He emphasized that the government had inquired into the matter, but that the actual push to have the meeting approve this was done by Fortis Bank, not by the government. All the opposition parties demanded that the Minister of Finance step down. Modrikamen achieved an additional victory in court: he was allowed to change the correspondence address of all the shareholders he represented to their individual addresses. A Dutch lawyer requested an injunction against the Dutch state: as the sale of the Dutch parts of Fortis is now illegitimate, any further actions concerning these parts any further actions should be frozen, pending the renegotiations and court actions.
On the eve of the April 28 meeting Modrikamen sought an injunction to exclude 170 million shares from voting; these were registered on the Cayman Islands and looked fishy. The Court denied this. The April 28 meeting, in Ghent, was attended by some 3000 shareholders; Modrikamen personally held a speech that led to the board being pelted with shoes and coins. The meeting was adjourned and remained boisterous after being resumed. In the end the sale was approved by some 73%. In contrast the April 29 meeting, in Utrecht, was calm, being attended by some 300 shareholders ; here too the issue of the 170 million shares was raised and this meeting also approved the sale, by some 78%.

After the April 28 and 29 meetings

On July 13, 2018, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal approved a €1.3 billion collective settlement of claims asserted on behalf of shareholders of the former Fortis, under the authority of the Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Claims or WCAM.
On December 20, 2018, the prosecutor decided to drop the case against seven former directors. The prosecution argued that it found insufficient evidence that they knowingly misled shareholders with over-optimistic company information.