Theft Act 1978
The Theft Act 1978 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom. It supplemented the earlier deception offences contained in sections 15 and 16 of the Theft Act 1968 by reforming some aspects of those offences and adding new provisions. See also the Fraud Act 2006.
Section 1 - Obtaining services by deception
This section created the offence of obtaining services by deception. It was repealed on 15 January 2007 by Schedule 3 to the Fraud Act 2006. As amended by the Theft Act 1996, it read:There must be a deception which, according to section 5, has the same meaning as in section 15 of the Theft Act 1968, i.e. any deception by words or conduct as to fact or as to law, including a deception as to the present intentions of the person using the deception or any other person. This deception must be the cause of the obtaining.
The defendant must obtain a service as defined in section 1, i.e. the victim must confer a benefit on the defendant. The 'services' must be non-gratuitous, i.e. the benefits must be provided by the victim of the deception in the expectation that they are to be paid for at commercial rates. It must be conferred by the doing, causing, or permitting of some act. A failure to act that confers a benefit is not sufficient. Thus, a person who employs a lawyer or accountant without ever intending to pay, may commit an offence under section 1. But a person who lies to a neighbour to secure the loan of a power drill does not commit an offence because the benefit is not obtained on the understanding that it has been or will be paid for. In R v Halai Crim LR 624, CA, the defendant made false statements in an application for a mortgage and thereby obtained a survey, the opening of an account and a mortgage advance. Note that the Theft Act 1996 introduced section 1 specifically to provide that a loan amounts to a service. This dispenses with that part of the decision in Halai As to the opening of an account, contrast R v Shortland Crim LR 893 in which the Court of Appeal held that, on the evidence presented, opening bank accounts under false names did not amount to the section 1 offence, but suggested that it might have done if evidence that it had to be paid for had been presented. The mens rea for all offences is dishonesty.
A person could commit this offence by obtaining services for another person.
As to obtaining of hire-purchase agreements, see R v Widdowson, 82 Cr App R 314, RTR 124, Crim LR 233, CA
The following cases are also relevant:
- R v Teong Sun Chuah and Teong Tatt Chuah Crim LR 463, CA
- R v Cooke Crim LR 436, 4 CL 187, 3 Archbold News 2, CA
- R v Cummings-John Crim LR 660
- R v Naviede Crim LR 662, CA
Section 18 of the Theft Act 1968 applied in relation to this section as it applied in relation to section 15 of the Theft Act 1968.
Mode of trial and sentence
This offence was triable either way. A person guilty of this offence was liable, on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding the prescribed sum, or to both.
Section 2 - Evasion of liability by deception
This section created the offence of evasion of liability by deception. It was repealed on 15 January 2007 by Schedule 3 to the Fraud Act 2006. It read:Section 2 is divided into three parts, all of which require that both a deception caused the obtaining, which may be for oneself or for another, and that there is a legally enforceable liability. All three also require proof that the creditor is deceived into releasing the defendant from the obligation to pay in some way., see R v Attewell-Hughes 1 WLR 955, 4 All ER 810, 93 Cr App R 132, Crim LR 437, CA.
See also R v Andrews and Hedges Crim LR 106.
Liability for offences by corporations
Section 18 of the Theft Act 1968 applied in relation to this section as it applied in relation to section 15 of the Theft Act 1968.
Remission of a debt
Section 2 covers the deception that dishonestly secures the remission of the whole or part of an existing liability to make a payment. Unlike the other two subsections, this requires that the victim knows a liability exists, and knows how much they are remitting. It does not cover situations where the defendant tricks the victim into believing that no money is owed and. If A borrows £50 from B and, when repayment is due, claims that a change of circumstances makes it impossible for him to repay some or all of the money; this deception persuades B to forgive the loan, or to accept £10 in full satisfaction. In R v Jackson, Jackson tendered a stolen credit card to pay for petrol and other goods, and it was accepted by a trader, who then looked to the issuing credit card company for payment and not to the person tendering the card. This was held to dishonestly secure the remission of an existing liability and Jackson was convicted. For these purposes, the existing liability to make a payment may be the defendant's own liability or another's.The provisions of section 2 clarify that section 2 does not apply where the liability has not been "accepted or established to pay compensation for a wrongful act or omission". This avoids the criminal law being a default liability for civil proceedings. Thus, if X lies about an accident to avoid a claim of negligence, no offence is committed. The claimant can commence civil proceedings once the deception is discovered.
Delaying payment of a debt
Like section 2, this requires an existing liability to make payment but, unlike, it does not require that the creditor knows they are "letting the defendant off". In R v Holt and Lee, the defendants ate a meal in a restaurant that cost £3.65. When presented with the bill, they claimed another waitress had already taken a £5 note from the table. Unfortunately, an off-duty policeman had overheard their planning. They were both convicted of an attempt by deception to induce the creditor to forego payment with intent to make permanent default. Their appeal against conviction was dismissed. The section is also concerned with dishonestly inducing a creditor to wait for payment. In many circumstances, this means that sections 2 and will overlap, but there are also situations in which they do not. Thus, creditors who remit will also forgo.A particular instance of "wait for payment" is provided by section 2, which was a necessary amendment because of the general principle that accepting a cheque as the means of payment, means that, until the creditor receives notice that the cheque has been dishonoured, they stop seeking payment: see R v Hammond. Section 2 provides that a person induced to take a cheque or other security for money by way of conditional satisfaction of an existing liability is to be treated not as being paid but as being induced to wait for payment. As mens rea, the defendant must make the deception with intent to make permanent default in whole or in part on any existing liability to make a payment of his own, or with intent to let another do so.
Avoiding incurring a debt
For there to be an offence under section 2 there must be dishonesty and a deception that obtains some exemption from or abatement of liability to make a payment. Because both sections 2 and require an "existing" liability to pay, they do not cover situations where the point of the deception is to prevent a liability from arising in the future. Section 2 would apply when a person flags down a taxi and claims only to have £5. The driver agrees to carry the passenger to the destination for this amount. The contract is made for a reduced amount, which is an "abatement" for these purposes. If the driver agreed to carry for no charge, this would be an "exemption". The Criminal Law Revision Committee gave examples where the defendant dishonestly obtained a rate rebate or a reduction in rent for the future. Another example would be waving a credit card at a ticket collector at a railway station to avoid having to pay to board the train. In roader than previous two offences as not limited to existing liabilities. In R v Firth, the defendant failed to tell the NHS that patients using NHS facilities were in fact private patients thereby obtaining facilities without payment. In R v Sibartie Crim LR 470, CA, the defendant was convicted of attempting section 2 when he deceived a ticket collector on the underground into believing that he had paid for the whole of his journey. In fact, he had only purchased tickets for the first few and last few stations in his journey. The court of first instance said that that was a dishonest attempt to obtain an exemption from the liability to pay the excess. On appeal, it was argued that this was an attempt to induce the creditor to forgo payment of part under section 2. The Court of Appeal held that although this illustrated the overlap between section 2 and section 2, it did not make liability under section 2 wrong.Mode of trial and sentence
This offence was triable either way. A person guilty of this offence was liable, on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years, or, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding the prescribed sum, or to both.Section 3 - Making off without payment
This section creates the offence of making off without payment. It provides:The following subsection was repealed by the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005:
This offence is triable either way. A person guilty of this offence is liable, on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years, or, on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to a fine not exceeding the prescribed sum, or to both.
In R v Allen, the House of Lords said that, in order for the offence to be committed, there must be "an intention to permanently deprive" by making off, and that a mere "intention to defer" payment is not sufficient. In theory, a person could eat a meal at a restaurant, not pay, but leave his name and address in order for the restaurant to start civil recovery procedures against him - as long as the details were correct, and he did intend to pay at some point in the future then no offence under Section 3 would be committed.
Section 4 - Punishments
Section 4 was repealed on 15 January 2007 by Schedule 3 to the Fraud Act 2006.Section 5 - Supplementary
Section 5 was repealed on 15 January 2007 by Schedule 3 to the Fraud Act 2006.Section 5 was repealed by section 37 of, and Schedule 2 to, the Extradition Act 1989.