Square of opposition
In philosophical logic, the square of opposition is a diagram representing the relations between the four basic categorical propositions.
The origin of the square can be traced back to Aristotle making the distinction between two oppositions: contradiction and contrariety.
However, Aristotle did not draw any diagram. This was done several centuries later by Apuleius and Boethius.
Summary
In traditional logic, a proposition is a spoken assertion, not the meaning of an assertion, as in modern philosophy of language and logic. A categorical proposition is a simple proposition containing two terms, subject and predicate, in which the predicate is either asserted or denied of the subject.Every categorical proposition can be reduced to one of four logical forms, named A, E, I, and O based on the Latin ', for the affirmative propositions A and I, and ', for the negative propositions E and O. These are:
- The 'A' proposition, the universal affirmative, whose form in Latin is 'omne S est P', usually translated as 'every S is a P'.
- The 'E' proposition, the universal negative, Latin form 'nullum S est P', usually translated as 'no S are P'.
- The 'I' proposition, the particular affirmative, Latin 'quoddam S est P', usually translated as 'some S are P'.
- The 'O' proposition, the particular negative, Latin 'quoddam S nōn est P', usually translated as 'some S are not P'.
Name | Symbol | Latin | English* | Mnemonic | Modern Form |
Universal affirmative | A | Omne S est P. | Every S is P. | ' | |
Universal negative | E | Nullum S est P. | No S is P. | ' | |
Particular affirmative | I | Quoddam S est P. | Some S is P. | ' | |
Particular negative | O | Quoddam S nōn est P. | Some S is not P. | ' |
*Proposition 'A' may be stated as "All S is P." However, Proposition 'E' when stated correspondingly as "All S is not P." is ambiguous because it can be either an E or O proposition, thus requiring a context to determine the form; the standard form "No S is P" is unambiguous, so it is preferred. Proposition 'O' also takes the forms "Sometimes S is not P." and "A certain S is not P."
Aristotle states, that there are certain logical relationships between these four kinds of proposition. He says that to every affirmation there corresponds exactly one negation, and that every affirmation and its negation are 'opposed' such that always one of them must be true, and the other false. A pair of affirmative and negative statements he calls a 'contradiction'. Examples of contradictories are 'every man is white' and 'not every man is white', 'no man is white' and 'some man is white'.
'Contrary' statements, are such that both cannot at the same time be true. Examples of these are the universal affirmative 'every man is white', and the universal negative 'no man is white'. These cannot be true at the same time. However, these are not contradictories because both of them may be false. For example, it is false that every man is white, since some men are not white. Yet it is also false that no man is white, since there are some white men.
Since every statement has a contradictory opposite, and since a contradictory is true when its opposite is false, it follows that the opposites of contraries can both be true, but they cannot both be false. Since subcontraries are negations of universal statements, they were called 'particular' statements by the medieval logicians.
Another logical opposition implied by this, though not mentioned explicitly by Aristotle, is 'alternation', consisting of 'subalternation' and 'superalternation'. Alternation is a relation between a particular statement and a universal statement of the same quality such that the particular is implied by the other. The particular is the subaltern of the universal, which is the particular's superaltern. For example, if 'every man is white' is true, its contrary 'no man is white' is false. Therefore, the contradictory 'some man is white' is true. Similarly the universal 'no man is white' implies the particular 'not every man is white'.
In summary:
- Universal statements are contraries: 'every man is just' and 'no man is just' cannot be true together, although one may be true and the other false, and also both may be false.
- Particular statements are subcontraries. 'Some man is just' and 'some man is not just' cannot be false together.
- The particular statement of one quality is the subaltern of the universal statement of that same quality, which is the superaltern of the particular statement because in Aristotelian semantics 'every A is B' implies 'some A is B' and 'no A is B' implies 'some A is not B'. Note that modern formal interpretations of English sentences interpret 'every A is B' as 'for any x, x is A implies x is B', which does not imply 'some x is A'. This is a matter of semantic interpretation, however, and does not mean, as is sometimes claimed, that Aristotelian logic is 'wrong'.
- The universal affirmative and the particular negative are contradictories. If some A is not B, not every A is B. Conversely, though this is not the case in modern semantics, it was thought that if every A is not B, some A is not B. This interpretation has caused difficulties. While Aristotle's Greek does not represent the particular negative as 'some A is not B', but as 'not every A is B', someone in his commentary on the Peri hermaneias, renders the particular negative as 'quoddam A nōn est B', literally 'a certain A is not a B', and in all medieval writing on logic it is customary to represent the particular proposition in this way.
The problem of [existential import]
Subcontraries, which medieval logicians represented in the form 'quoddam A est B' and 'quoddam A non est B' cannot both be false, since their universal contradictory statements cannot both be true. This leads to a difficulty that was first identified by Peter Abelard. 'Some A is B' seems to imply 'something is A'. For example, 'Some man is white' seems to imply that at least one thing is a man, namely the man who has to be white, if 'some man is white' is true. But, 'some man is not white' also implies that something is a man, namely the man who is not white, if the statement 'some man is not white' is true. But Aristotelian logic requires that necessarily one of these statements is true. Both cannot be false. Therefore, it follows that necessarily something is a man, i.e. men exist. But surely men might not exist?Abelard also points out that subcontraries containing subject terms denoting nothing, such as 'a man who is a stone', are both false.
Terence Parsons argues that ancient philosophers did not experience the problem of existential import as only the A and I forms had existential import.
He goes on to cite medieval philosopher William of Moerbeke
And points to Boethius' translation of Aristotle's work as giving rise to the mistaken notion that the O form has existential import.
Modern squares of opposition
In the 19th century, George Boole argued for requiring existential import on both terms in particular claims, but allowing all terms of universal claims to lack existential import. This decision made Venn diagrams particularly easy to use for term logic. The square of opposition, under this Boolean set of assumptions, is often called the modern Square of opposition. In the modern square of opposition, A and O claims are contradictories, as are E and I, but all other forms of opposition cease to hold; there are no contraries, subcontraries, or subalterns. Thus, from a modern point of view, it often makes sense to talk about 'the' opposition of a claim, rather than insisting as older logicians did that a claim has several different opposites, which are in different kinds of opposition with the claim.Gottlob Frege's Begriffsschrift also presents a square of oppositions, organised in an almost identical manner to the classical square, showing the contradictories, subalternates and contraries between four formulae constructed from universal quantification, negation and implication.
Algirdas Julien Greimas' semiotic square was derived from Aristotle's work.
The traditional square of opposition is now often compared with squares based on inner- and outer-negation.