Salafi jihadism


Salafi jihadism or jihadist-Salafism is a transnational religious-political ideology based on a belief in "physical" jihadism and the Salafi movement of returning to what adherents believe to be true Sunni Islam.
The terms "Salafist jihadist" and "jihadist-Salafism" were coined by scholar Gilles Kepel in 2002 to describe "a hybrid Islamist ideology" developed by international Islamist volunteers in the Afghan anti-Soviet jihad who had become isolated from their national and social class origins. The concept was described by Martin Kramer as an academic term that "will inevitably be jihadism or the jihadist movement in popular usage."
Practitioners are referred to as "Salafi jihadis" or "Salafi jihadists". They are sometimes described as a variety of Salafi, and sometimes as separate from "good Salafis" whose movement eschews any political and organisational allegiances as potentially divisive for the Muslim community and a distraction from the study of religion.
In the 1990s, extremist jihadists of the al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya were active in the attacks on police, government officials and tourists in Egypt, and Armed Islamic Group of Algeria was a principal group in the Algerian Civil War. The most infamous jihadist-Salafist attack is the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United States by al-Qaeda. While Salafism had next-to-no presence in Europe in the 1980s, Salafist jihadists had by the mid-2000s acquired "a burgeoning presence in Europe, having attempted more than 30 terrorist attacks among E.U. countries since 2001." While many see the influence and activities of Salafi jihadists as in decline after 2000, others see the movement as growing, in the wake of the Arab Spring and the breakdown of state control in Libya and Syria.

History and definition

writes that the Salafis whom he encountered in Europe in the 1980s, were "totally apolitical". However, by the mid-1990s, he met some who felt jihad in the form of "violence and terrorism" was "justified to realize their political objectives". The combination of Salafi alienation from all things non-Muslim – including "mainstream European society" – and violent jihad created a "volatile mixture". "When you're in the state of such alienation you become easy prey to the jihadi guys who will feed you more savory propaganda than the old propaganda of the Salafists who tell you to pray, fast and who are not taking action".
According to Kepel, Salafist jihadism combined "respect for the sacred texts in their most literal form,... with an absolute commitment to jihad, whose number-one target had to be America, perceived as the greatest enemy of the faith."
Salafi jihadists distinguished themselves from salafis they term "sheikist", so named because – the jihadists believed – the "sheikists" had forsaken adoration of God for adoration of "the oil sheiks of the Arabian peninsula, with the Al Saud family at their head". Principal among the sheikist scholars was Abd al-Aziz ibn Baz – "the archetypal court ulema ". These allegedly "false" salafi "had to be striven against and eliminated", but even more infuriating was the Muslim Brotherhood, who were believed by Salafi jihadists to be excessively moderate and lacking in literal interpretation of holy texts. Iyad El-Baghdadi describes Salafism as "deeply divided" into "mainstream Salafism", and jihadi Salafism.
Another definition of Salafi jihadism, offered by Mohammed M. Hafez, is an "extreme form of Sunni Islamism that rejects democracy and Shia rule". Hafez distinguished them from apolitical and conservative Salafi scholars, but also from the sahwa movement associated with Salman al-Ouda or Safar Al-Hawali.
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, contemporary jihadi Salafism is characterized by "five features":
Another researcher, Thomas Hegghammer, has outlined five objectives shared by jihadis:
Robin Wright notes the importance in Salafi jihadist groups of

Leaders and development

"Theoreticians" of Salafist jihadism included Afghan jihad veterans such as the Palestinian Abu Qatada, the Syrian Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, the Egyptian Mustapha Kamel, known as Abu Hamza al-Masri. Osama bin Laden was its most well-known leader. The dissident Saudi preachers Salman al-Ouda and Safar Al-Hawali, were held in high esteem by this school.
Murad al-Shishani of The Jamestown Foundation states there have been three generations of Salafi-jihadists: those waging jihad in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Iraq. As of the mid-2000s, Arab fighters in Iraq were "the latest and most important development of the global Salafi-jihadi movement". These fighters were usually not Iraqis, but volunteers who had come to Iraq from other countries, mainly Saudi Arabia. Unlike in earlier Salafi jihadi actions, Egyptians "are no longer the chief ethnic group". According to Bruce Livesey Salafist jihadists are currently a "burgeoning presence in Europe, having attempted more than 30 terrorist attacks among EU countries" from September 2001 to the beginning of 2005".
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, in Iraq jihadi salafi are pursuing a "system-collapse strategy" whose goal is to install an "Islamic emirate based on Salafi dominance, similar to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan." In addition to occupation/coalition personnel they target mainly Iraqi security forces and Shia civilians, but also "foreign journalists, translators and transport drivers and the economic and physical infrastructure of Iraq."

Groups

Salafist jihadists groups include Al Qaeda, the now defunct Algerian Armed Islamic Group, and the Egyptian group Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya which still exists.
In the Algerian Civil War 1992–1998, the GIA was one of the two major Islamist armed groups fighting the Algerian army and security forces. The GIA included veterans of the Afghanistan jihad and unlike the more moderate AIS, fought to destabilize the Algerian government with terror attacks designed to "create an atmosphere of general insecurity". It considered jihad in Algeria fard ayn or an obligation for all Muslims, and sought to "purge" Algeria of "the ungodly" and create an Islamic state. It pursued what Gilles Kepel called a "wholesale massacres of civilians", targeting French-speaking intellectuals, foreigners, and Islamists deemed too moderate, and took a campaign of bombing to France, which supported the Algerian government against the Islamists. Although over 150,000 were killed in the civil war, the GIA eventually lost popular support and was crushed by the security forces. Remnants of the GIA continued on as "Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat", which as of 2015 calls itself al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.
Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, another Salafist-jihadi movement fought an insurgency against the Egyptian government from 1992 to 1998 during which at least 800 Egyptian policemen and soldiers, jihadists, and civilians were killed. Outside of Egypt it is best known for a November 1997 attack at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor where fifty-eight foreign tourists were hacked and shot to death. The group declared a ceasefire in March 1999, although as of 2012 it is still active in jihad against the Bashar al-Assad regime Syria.
Perhaps the most famous and effective Salafist jihadist group was Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda evolved from the Maktab al-Khidamat, or the "Services Office", a Muslim organization founded in 1984 to raise and channel funds and recruit foreign mujahideen for the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. It was established in Peshawar, Pakistan, by Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam. As it became apparent that the jihad had compelled the Soviet military to abandon its mission in Afghanistan, some mujahideen called for the expansion of their operations to include Islamist struggles in other parts of the world, and Al Qaeda was formed by bin Laden on August 11, 1988. Members were to making a pledge to follow one's superiors. Al-Qaeda emphasized jihad against the "far enemy", i.e. the United States. In 1996, it announced its jihad to expel foreign troops and interests from what they considered Islamic lands, and in 1998, it issued a fatwa calling on Muslims to kill Americans and their allies whenever and wherever they could. Among its most notable acts of violence were the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi that killed over 200 people; and the 9/11 attacks of 2001 that killed almost 3000 people and caused many billions of dollars in damage.
According to Mohammed M. Hafez, "as of 2006 the two major groups within the jihadi Salafi camp" in Iraq were the Mujahidin Shura Council and the Ansar al Sunna Group. There are also a number of small jihadist Salafist groups in Azerbaijan.
The group leading the Islamist insurgency in Southern Thailand in 2006 by carrying out most of the attacks and cross-border operations, BRN-Koordinasi, favours Salafi ideology. It works in a loosely organized strictly clandestine cell system dependent on hard-line religious leaders for direction.
Jund Ansar Allah is, or was, an armed Salafist jihadist organization in the Gaza Strip. On August 14, 2009, the group's spiritual leader, Sheikh Abdel Latif Moussa, announced during Friday sermon the establishment of an Islamic emirate in the Palestinian territories attacking the ruling authority, the Islamist group Hamas, for failing to enforce Sharia law. Hamas forces responded to his sermon by surrounding his Ibn Taymiyyah mosque complex and attacking it. In the fighting that ensued, 24 people, were killed and over 130 were wounded.
In 2011, Salafist jihadists were actively involved with protests against King Abdullah II of Jordan, and the kidnapping and killing of Italian peace activist Vittorio Arrigoni in Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.
In the North Caucasus region of Russia, the Caucasus Emirate replaced the nationalism of Muslim Chechnya and Dagestan with a hard-line Salafist-takfiri jihadist ideology. They are immensely focused on upholding the concept of tawhid, and fiercely reject any practice of shirk, taqlid, ijtihad and bid‘ah. They also believe in the complete separation between the Muslim and the non-Muslim, by propagating Al Wala' Wal Bara' and declaring takfir against any Muslim who is a mushrik and does not return to the observance of tawhid and the strict literal interpretation of the Quran and the Sunnah as followed by Muhammad and his companions.
In Syria and Iraq both Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS have been described as Salafist-jihadist. Jabhat al-Nusra has been described as possessing "a hard-line Salafi-Jihadist ideology" and being one of "the most effective" groups fighting the regime. Writing after ISIS victories in Iraq, Hassan Hassan believes ISIS is a reflection of "ideological shakeup of Sunni Islam's traditional Salafism" since the Arab Spring, where salafism, "traditionally inward-looking and loyal to the political establishment", has "steadily, if slowly", been eroded by Salafism-jihadism.

List of groups

According to Seth G. Jones of the Rand Corporation, as of 2014, there were around 50 Salafist-jihadist groups in existence or recently in existence..
Name of GroupBase of OperationsYears
Abdullah Azzam Brigades
Saudi Arabia2009–present
Abdullah Azzam Brigades
Lebanon2009–present
Abu Sayyaf Group Philippines1991–present
Aden-Abyan Islamic Army Yemen1994–present
Al-Itihaad al-Islamiya Somalia, Ethiopia1994–2002
Al-Qaeda Pakistan1988–present
Al-Qaeda in Aceh
Indonesia2009–2011
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Saudi Arabia2002–2008
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula Yemen2008–present
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
Algeria1998–present
Al Takfir wal al-Hijrah,Egypt 2011–present
Al-Mulathamun Mali, Libya, Algeria2012–2013
Al-Murabitun Mali, Libya, Algeria2013–2017
Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia-
Union of Islamic Courts 		Somalia, Eritrea2006–2009
Ansar al-IslamIraq2001–present
Ansar al-Sharia Egypt2012–present
Ansar al-Sharia Libya2012–2017
Ansar al-Sharia Mali2012–present
Ansar al-Sharia Tunisia2011–present
Ansar Bait al-Maqdis
Gaza Strip, Egypt 2012–present
AnsaruNigeria2012–present
Osbat al-Ansar Lebanon1985–present
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
Philippines2010–present
Boko HaramNigeria2003–present
Chechen Republic of Ichkeria
Russia 1994–2007
East Turkestan Islamic Movement China 1989–present
Egyptian Islamic Jihad Egypt1978–2001
Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-IslamiyyaSyria2012–present
Harakat al-Shabaab al-MujahideenSomalia2002–present
Harakat al-Shuada’a al Islamiyah
Libya1996–2007
Harakat Ansar al-DinMali2011–2017
Hizbul al IslamSomalia2009–2010
Imarat Kavkaz Russia 2007–present
Indian MujahedeenIndia2005–present
Islamic Jihad Union
Uzbekistan2002–present
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan1997–present
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant Iraq, Syria2004–present
Jabhat al-NusrahSyria2011–present
Jaish ul-AdlIran2013–present
Jaish al-Islam
Gaza Strip, Egypt 2005–present
Jaish al-Ummah Gaza Strip2007–present
Jamaat Ansar Bayt al-MaqdisEgypt 2011–present
Jamaat Ansarullah Tajikistan2010–present
Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid Indonesia2008–present
Jemaah Islamiyah Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore		1993–present
JondullahPakistan2003–present
Jund al-ShamLebanon, Syria, Gaza Strip,
Qatar, Afghanistan		1999–2008
Khalifa Islamiyah Mindanao Philippines2013–present
Lashkar-e-Taiba Pakistan 1990–present
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group Libya1990–present
Liwa al-IslamSyria2011–present
Liwa al-TawhidSyria2012–present
Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group Morocco, Western Europe1998–present
Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa
Mali2011–2013
Muhammad Jamal Network Egypt2011–present
Mujahideen Shura CouncilGaza Strip, Egypt 2011–present
Salafia Jihadia Morocco1995–present
Suqour al-Sham BrigadeSyria2011–2015
Tawhid wal JihadIraq1999–2004
Tunisian Combat Group Tunisia, Western Europe2000–2011

Ruling strategy

In several places and times jihadis have taken control over an area and ruled it as an Islamic state, such as in the case of the ISIL in Syria and Iraq.
As Islamists, establishing uncompromised sharia law is a core value and goal of jihadists, but strategies differed on how quickly this should be done. Observers such as journalist Robert Worth have described jihadis as torn between wanting to build true Islamic order gradually from the bottom up to avoid alienating non-jihadi Muslims, and not wanting to wait for the Islamic state.
In Zinjibar, Yemen, AQAP established an "emirate" that lasted from May 2011 until the summer of 2012. It emphasized not strict sharia law, but "uncharacteristically gentle" good governance over its conquered territory—rebuilding infrastructure, quashing banditry, and resolving legal disputes.
One jihadi veteran of Yemen described its approach towards the local population:
You have to take a gradual approach with them when it comes to religious practices. You can't beat people for drinking alcohol when they don't even know the basics of how to pray. We have to first stop the great sins, and then move gradually to the lesser and lesser ones... Try to avoid enforcing Islamic punishments as much as possible unless you are forced to do so.
However AQAP's "clemency drained away under the pressure of war", and the area was taken back by the government. The failure of this model , may have "taught" jihadis a lesson on the need to instill fear.
The ISIS, is thought to have used for its model a manifesto entitled "The Management of Savagery", which emphasizes the need to create areas of "savagery", i.e. lawlessness, in enemy territory. Once the enemy was too exhausted and weakened from the lawlessness to continue to try and govern, the nucleus of a new caliphate could be established in their absence. The author of "The Management of Savagery", emphasized not so much winning the sympathy of the local Muslims but extreme violence, writing that: "One who previously engaged in jihad knows that it is naught but violence, crudeness, terrorism, frightening and massacring – I am talking about jihad and fighting, not about Islam and one should not confuse them."

Condemnations by Muslims and Challenges

Thousands of Muslim leaders and scholars and dozens of Islamic councils have denounced Salafi jihadism. Some scholars, policy institutes, and political scientists have noted a growing concern that Salafism and Wahhabism can be a gateway to terrorism and violent extremism. Notable challenges in countering Salafi jihadism are funding from oil-rich Gulf nations and private donations which are difficult to track, Saudi efforts to propagate its Wahhabi ideology around the Muslim world, resentment for Western hegemony, authoritarian Arab regimes, feeling defenseless against foreign aggression and that "Muslim blood is cheap," weak governance, extremist Salafi preaching that counters moderate voices, and other challenges.