Reversal symmetry


Reversal symmetry is a voting system criterion which requires that if candidate A is the unique winner, and each voter's individual preferences are inverted, then A must not be elected. Methods that satisfy reversal symmetry include Borda count, the Kemeny-Young method, and the Schulze method. Methods that fail include Bucklin voting, instant-runoff voting and Condorcet methods that fail the Condorcet loser criterion such as Minimax.
For cardinal voting systems which can be meaningfully reversed, approval voting and range voting satisfy the criterion.

Examples

Instant-runoff voting

Consider a preferential system where 11 voters express their preferences as:
With the Borda count A would get 23 points, B would get 24 points, and C would get 19 points, so B would be elected. In instant-runoff, C would be eliminated in the first round and A would be elected in the second round by 7 votes to 4.
Now reversing the preferences:
With the Borda count A would get 21 points, B would get 20 points, and C would get 25 points, so this time C would be elected. In instant-runoff, B would be eliminated in the first round and A would as before be elected in the second round, this time by 6 votes to 5.

Majority Judgment

This example shows that Majority Judgment violates the Reversal symmetry criterion. Assume two candidates A and B and 2 voters with the following ratings:
Candidates/
  1. of voters
AB
1GoodFair
1PoorFair
Now, the winners are determined for the normal and the reversed ballots.

Normal order

In the following the Majority Judgment winner for the normal ballots is determined.
Candidates/
  1. of voters
AB
1GoodFair
1PoorFair
The sorted ratings would be as follows:
Result: The median of A is between "Good" and "Poor" and thus is rounded down to "Poor". The median of B is "Fair". Thus, B is elected Majority Judgment winner.

Reversed order

In the following the Majority Judgment winner for the reversed ballots is determined. For reversing, the higher ratings are considered to be mirror-inverted to the lower ratings.
Candidates/
  1. of voters
AB
1PoorFair
1GoodFair
The sorted ratings would be as follows:
Result: Still, the median of A is between "Good" and "Poor" and thus is rounded down to "Poor". The median of B is "Fair". Thus, B is elected Majority Judgment winner for the reversed ballots.

Conclusion

B is the Majority Judgment winner using the normal ballots and also using the ballots with reversed ratings. Thus, Majority Judgment fails the Reversal symmetry criterion.
However, note that using another rounding method could prevent the failure to Reversal symmetry. Also, note that this situation is unlikely to arise in practical elections with many voters because it involves a "tie" of sorts - some candidate gets exactly the same number of votes above and below a certain value.

Minimax

This example shows that the Minimax method violates the Reversal symmetry criterion. Assume four candidates A, B, C and D with 14 voters with the following preferences:
# of votersPreferences
4A > B > D > C
4B > C > A > D
2C > D > A > B
1D > A > B > C
1D > B > C > A
2D > C > A > B

Since all preferences are strict rankings, all three Minimax methods elect the same winners.
Now, the winners are determined for the normal and the reversed order.

Normal order

In the following the Minimax winner for the ballots in normal order is determined.
# of votersPreferences
4A > B > D > C
4B > C > A > D
2C > D > A > B
1D > A > B > C
1D > B > C > A
2D > C > A > B

The results would be tabulated as follows:
Result: The candidates A, B, and C form a cycle with clear defeats. D benefits from that since its two losses are relatively close and therefore D's biggest defeat is the closest of all candidates. Thus, D is elected Minimax winner.

Reversed order

In the following the Minimax winner for the ballots in reversed order is determined.
# of votersPreferences
4C > D > B > A
4D > A > C > B
2B > A > D > C
1C > B > A > D
1A > C > B > D
2B > A > C > D

The results would be tabulated as follows:
Result: Still, the candidates A, B, and C form a cycle with clear defeats and D benefits from that. Therefore D's biggest defeat is the closest of all candidates. Thus, D is elected Minimax winner.

Conclusion

D is the Minimax winner using the normal preference order and also using the ballots with reversed preference orders. Thus, Minimax fails the Reversal symmetry criterion.

Plurality voting

This example shows that Plurality voting violates the Reversal symmetry criterion. Assume three candidates A, B and C and 4 voters with the following preferences:
# of votersPreferences
1A > B > C
1C > B > A
1B > A > C
1C > A > B

Note that reversing all the ballots, leads to the same set of ballots, since the reversed preference order of the first voter resembles the preference order of the second, and similarly with the third and fourth.
In the following the Plurality winner is determined. Plurality ballots only contain the single favorite:
# of votersFavorite
1A
1B
2C

Result: The candidates A and B receive 1 vote each, candidate C receives a plurality of 2 votes. Thus, C is elected Plurality winner.
C is the Plurality winner using the normal ballots and also using the reversed ballot. Thus, Plurality fails the Reversal symmetry criterion.
Note, that every voting system that satisfies the Reversal symmetry criterion, would have to lead to a tie in this example.