Ranked pairs


Ranked pairs or the Tideman method is an electoral system developed in 1987 by Nicolaus Tideman that selects a single winner using votes that express preferences. RP can also be used to create a sorted list of winners.
If there is a candidate who is preferred over the other candidates, when compared in turn with each of the others, RP guarantees that candidate will win. Because of this property, RP is, by definition, a Condorcet method.

Procedure

The RP procedure is as follows:
  1. Tally the vote count comparing each pair of candidates, and determine the winner of each pair
  2. Sort each pair, by the largest strength of victory first to smallest last.
  3. "Lock in" each pair, starting with the one with the largest number of winning votes, and add one in turn to a graph as long as they do not create a cycle. The completed graph shows the winner.
RP can also be used to create a sorted list of preferred candidates.
To create a sorted list, repeatedly use RP to select a winner,
remove that winner from the list of candidates,
and repeat.

Tally

To tally the votes, consider each voter's preferences.
For example, if a voter states "A > B > C"
, the tally
should add one for A in A vs. B, one for A in A vs. C, and
one for B in B vs. C.
Voters may also express indifference, and unstated
candidates are assumed to be equal to the stated candidates.
Once tallied the majorities can be determined.
If "Vxy" is the number of Votes that rank x over y, then
"x" wins if Vxy > Vyx, and "y" wins if Vyx > Vxy.

Sort

The pairs of winners, called the "majorities", are then sorted from
the largest majority to the smallest majority.
A majority for x over y precedes a majority for z over w
if and only if one of the following conditions holds:
  1. Vxy > Vzw. In other words, the majority having more support for its alternative is ranked first.
  2. Vxy = Vzw and Vwz > Vyx. Where the majorities are equal, the majority with the smaller minority opposition is ranked first.

    Lock

The next step is to examine each pair in turn to determine
the pairs to "lock in".
  1. Lock in the first sorted pair with the greatest majority.
  2. Evaluate the next pair on whether a Condorcet cycle occurs when this pair is added to the locked pairs.
  3. If a cycle is detected, the evaluated pair is skipped.
  4. If a cycle is not detected, the evaluated pair is locked in with the other locked pairs.
  5. Loop back to Step #2 until all pairs have been exhausted.
Condorcet cycle evaluation can be visualized by drawing an arrow from the pair's winner to the pair's loser in a directed graph.
Using the sorted list above, lock in each pair in turn unless
the pair will create a circularity in the graph
.

Winner

In the resulting graph for the locked pairs, the source corresponds to the winner. A source is bound to exist because the graph is a directed acyclic graph by construction, and such graphs always have sources. In the absence of pairwise ties, the source is also unique.

An example

The situation

The results would be tabulated as follows:
First, list every pair, and determine the winner:
PairWinner
Memphis vs. Nashville Nashville 58%
Memphis vs. Chattanooga Chattanooga 58%
Memphis vs. Knoxville Knoxville 58%
Nashville vs. Chattanooga Nashville 68%
Nashville vs. Knoxville Nashville 68%
Chattanooga vs. Knoxville Chattanooga: 83%

Note that absolute counts of votes can be used, or
percentages of the total number of votes; it makes no difference since it is the ratio of votes between two candidates that matters.

Sort

The votes are then sorted.
The largest majority is "Chattanooga over Knoxville"; 83% of the
voters prefer Chattanooga.
Nashville beats both Chattanooga and Knoxville by a score
of 68% over 32%.
Since Chattanooga > Knoxville, and they are the losers,
Nashville vs. Knoxville will be added first, followed by
Nashville vs. Chattanooga.
Thus, the pairs from above would be sorted this way:
PairWinner
Chattanooga vs. Knoxville Chattanooga 83%
Nashville vs. Knoxville Nashville 68%
Nashville vs. Chattanooga Nashville 68%
Memphis vs. Nashville Nashville 58%
Memphis vs. Chattanooga Chattanooga 58%
Memphis vs. Knoxville Knoxville 58%

Lock

The pairs are then locked in order, skipping any pairs
that would create a cycle:
In this case, no cycles are created by any of the
pairs, so every single one is locked in.
Every "lock in" would add another arrow to the
graph showing the relationship between the candidates.
Here is the final graph.
In this example, Nashville is the winner using RP, followed by Chattanooga, Knoxville, and Memphis in second, third, and fourth places respectively.

Ambiguity resolution example

For a simple situation involving candidates A, B, and C.
In this situation we "lock in" the majorities starting with the greatest one first.
Therefore, A is the winner.

Summary

In the example election, the winner is Nashville. This would be true for any Condorcet method.
Using the First-past-the-post voting and some other systems, Memphis would have won the election by having the most people, even though Nashville won every simulated pairwise election outright. Using Instant-runoff voting in this example would result in Knoxville winning even though more people preferred Nashville over Knoxville.

Criteria

Of the formal voting criteria, the ranked pairs method passes the majority criterion, the monotonicity criterion, the Smith criterion, the Condorcet loser criterion, and the independence of clones criterion. Ranked pairs fails the consistency criterion and the participation criterion. While ranked pairs is not fully independent of irrelevant alternatives, it still satisfies local independence of irrelevant alternatives.

Independence of irrelevant alternatives

Ranked pairs fails independence of irrelevant alternatives. However, the method adheres to a less strict property, sometimes called independence of Smith-dominated alternatives. It says that if one candidate wins an election, and a new alternative is added, X will win the election if Y is not in the Smith set. ISDA implies the Condorcet criterion.

Comparison table

The following table compares Ranked Pairs with other preferential single-winner election methods: