The Pukkŭksŏng-1 or Bukgeukseong-1, alternatively KN-11 in intelligence communities outside North Korea, is a North Korean, submarine-launched ballistic missile that was successfully flight tested on 24 August 2016. As of 2019, there have been no flight tests since. Pukkŭksŏng-1 is officially recognized by North Korea, South Korea and the United States as a missile that went through a complete, successful test on 24 August 2016. North Korea has never announced the actual operational range and payload, as this technical information is probably considered classified. Most countries do this: e.g., the United States considers the exact operational range of its current SLBM, UGM-133 Trident II, as classified information as well.
List of tests
As of 2019, there have been no further flight tests.
Strategic implications
The Pukkuksong-1 is the first sign of a North Korean sea-based nuclear deterrent, which complicates the U.S. and South Korean ability to preemptively destroy the country's nuclear capabilities by threatening a second strike. While there is a chance to take out land-based nuclear sites, ballistic missile submarines ensure that a retaliatory strike could still be launched before it can be found and neutralized. North Korea's unique circumstances limit the ways such a capability could be employed. The Korean People's Navy has no nuclear submarines, and no diesel-electric submarines equipped with air independent propulsion, so the launch submarine's range is limited and assuredly prevents it from threatening America's western seaboard. Given their submarines' insufficient power to outrun U.S. Navy nuclear attack submarines and lack of aerial and surface coverage to protect them out to long distances, they cannot venture far out to sea, although a scenario where a missile-equipped sub travels into the Sea of Japan on a "suicide mission" to fire the Pukkuksong-1 before it expects to inevitably get destroyed is not implausible given the loyalty of the elite crewmen of the submarine force. A more likely scenario would be deployment along the Korean coastline within North Korean local air and surface cover and silent movement into or out of various hiding spots like bays, inlets, and outer isles before achievement of a pre-designated position, with quiet submerged operation on battery power; because of its finite power capacity, the sub would have to surface or snorkel for air to recharge its batteries if it remains hiding for an extended period, making it vulnerable to anti-submarine warfare efforts. A land based, mobile derivative of the Pukkuksong-1 would significantly complicate U.S, Japan and South Korean defenses. Unlike the liquid fueled Rodong or SCUD derivatives, the solid fueled Pukkuksong-1 can be fired at a much shorter notification time. The North Korean have since achieved this Pukkuksong-2 land-based, mobile derivative of the Pukkuksong-1 milestone in their 12th test of the missile on 12 February 2017.
First completely successful test
On 24 August 2016 at around 5:30am, North Korea successfully tested the Pukkuksong-1 as the missile flew 500 km into Japan's ADIZ without issue. Unlike the recent successful Musudan flight, KCNA did not officially announce the test until a day later, calling it a great success on the part of Kim Jong Un. The entire development has since been published worldwide. In light of recent development of the Pukkuksong-1, South Korean military sources concluded that the first successful Pukkuksong-1 test was in fact launched in lofted trajectory. This is without confirmation of the actual apogee, and therefore the range could have been at least 1,000 km or more had the missile launched in normal trajectory and could be operationally deployed as early as 2017. Hawkish forces in South Korea have renewed calls for South Korea to construct nuclear submarines to counter North Korea's 'provocation'. However, the US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins University rejected South Korean claims that the Pukkuksong-1 could be operationally deployed before 2017, suggesting its initial operational capability will not be achieved before June 2018. Specifically, North Korea still faces significant technological challenges, including building a new class of submarine to carry 3 such missiles at once. On 30 August 2016, David Wright, a missile expert and co-director of the Union of Concerned Scientists' Global Security Program, suggested that the apogee achieved by this test was 550 km and the range would have been 1,250 km, assuming the same payload on standard trajectory. On the same day, the South Korean media reported that Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, since recommends that South Korea deploy 2 batteries of THAAD instead of 1 in order to counter the possibility of North Korea's firing a Pukkuksong-1 outside its 120-degree field of vision. However, Lewis also stressed that it does little to address the possibility of lofted attack, because the missile's reentry in lofted trajectory will be at very high speeds and at a very steep angle, the ability of THAAD interception depending on the missile range. He also noted that THAAD was never field tested against an intermediate-range target or on an unusual angle of attack. With this in mind, he ended by suggesting it is time to use diplomatic measures for dissuading North Korea from enhancing such capabilities and defense measures. This is a very ineffective strategy, since North Korea has the ability to use numerous counter-measures for every measures the US and South Korea have.
Suspected Chinese involvement in the proliferation of SLBM technologies of North Korea
On 3 September 2016, US expert Bruce Bechtol, a North Korea expert at Angelo State University, and another South Korean national security researcher, Shin Jong-woo, claimed that China must have provided North Korea with the relevant SLBM technologies, since it took a mere 4 months from the first successful Cold launch Test to the first complete test and further claimed that the Pukkuksong-1 is a carbon-copy of first China's first SLBM, JL-1. In comparison, China took 15 years to develop JL-1. Bruce Bechtol also stated his analysis is supported by space program expert Tal Inbar of Israel's Fisher Institute. However, Dave Schmerler of the James Martin Center of Non Proliferation Studies noted that the North Korean missile used a single engine design and grid fins for flight stability, features not found on the Chinese JL-1, and urged caution in jumping to conclusions. He added that the single-engine design had more in common with the Iranian Sejjil MRBM than the JL-1.
Response from China to alleged proliferation activities
