Perceptual transparency


Perceptual transparency is the phenomenon of seeing one surface behind another.
In our everyday life, we often experience the view of objects through transparent surfaces.
Physically transparent surfaces allow the transmission of a certain amount of light rays
through them. Sometimes nearly the totality of rays is transmitted across the surface without
significant changes of direction or chromaticity, as in the case of air; sometimes only light at
a certain wavelength is transmitted, as for coloured glass.
Perceptually, the problem of transparency is much more challenging: both the light rays
coming from the transparent surface and those coming from the object behind it do reach the
same retinal location, triggering a single sensorial process. The system somehow maps this
information onto a perceptual representation of two different objects.
Physical transparency was shown to be neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for
perceptual transparency.
Fuchs showed that when a small portion of a transparent surface is observed, neither the surface colour, nor the fusion colour is perceived, but only the colour resulting from the fusion of that of the transparent surface and that of the background.
Tudor-Hart showed it is not possible to perceive transparency in a totally
homogeneous field. Metzger showed that patterns of opaque paper can induce the
illusion of transparency, in the absence of physical transparency. In order to distinguish
perceptual from physical transparency, the former has often been addressed as transparency
illusion.
Paradoxically, however, two models developed within a physical context have long
dominated the research in the field of perceptual transparency: the episcotister model by
Metelli and the filter model by Beck et al..

Metelli’s episcotister model and the luminance conditions for transparency

Although he was not the first author to study the phenomenon of transparency illusion, the
Gestalt psychologist Metelli was probably the one who made the major contribution to the
problem.
Like his forecomers, Metelli faces the problem from a phenomenical more than from a
physiological point of view. In other words, he did not investigate which are the
physiological algorithms or the brain networks underlying transparency perception, but
studied and classified the conditions under which a transparency illusion is generated. In
doing so, Metelli marks an approach to the problem that will be followed by many scientists
after him.
The model is based on the idea that the perceptual colour scission following transparency
is the opposite of colour fusion in a rotating episcotister, i.e. a rotating disk that alternates
open and solid sectors.
Metelli referred to colour fusion in a physical situation in which an episcotister rotates in
front of an opaque background of reflectance A; the episcotister has an open sector of size t and a solid sector of size having reflectance r. The
reflectance of the solid sectors and that of background are fused by rotation to produce a
virtual reflectance value :
that is the weighted sum of background reflectance and episcotister solid sector
reflectance.
An episcotister is not a transparent object. Nevertheless, Beck et al. proposed an
alternative model, based on transparent filters, that has the characteristic of including the
effects of repetitive reflections between the transparent layer and the underlying surface.
Both the episcotister model and the filter model, in their original formulation, were written
in terms of reflectance values. A consequence is that their validity as physical models is
dependent on the illumination conditions. However, both models can be rewritten in terms of
luminance, as shown by Gerbino et al..
Although physically correct in a number of situations, the filter model never gained a
significant role in the prediction of perceptual transparency. In spite of being
much more complicated than the episcotister model, it doesn’t lead to significant
improvements in predictions about the occurrence of the illusion.
While Metelli's episcotister model has long remained the preferred framework for the
study of luminance conditions in transparency illusion, its validity as a theory of perception
has been challenged by different studies.
Beck et al. showed that only constraints and imposed by the episcotister
model are necessary for illusion of transparency; when constraints and are not
fulfilled, the illusion can still be experienced. They also argued that the degree of perceived
transparency depends on lightness more than reflectance.
Masin and Fukuda proposed as alternative conditions for transparency to and
the ordinal condition p Є , that was shown to agree better than
episcotister model with transparency-judgements performed by naïve subjects in a yes-no
task.
Metelli's equations were extended to three-dimensional colour space by D'Zmura et al.
. According to the model, transparency illusion would be generated by coherent
convergence and translation in colour space. However, also in colour space, evidence was
found in which the perceptual appearance does not reflect the physical model. For instance,
D'Zmura et al. showed that equiluminant convergence and translation in colour space
can elicit an impression of transparency, even if no episcotister nor physical filter can
generate this stimulus configuration. Chen and D'Zmura showed deviations from the
predictions of convergence model when the transparent regions have complementary hues.