National Popular Vote Interstate Compact
The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact is an agreement among a group of U.S. states and the District of Columbia to award all their electoral votes to whichever presidential candidate wins the overall popular vote in the 50 states and the District of Columbia. The compact is designed to ensure that the candidate who receives the most votes nationwide is elected president, and it would come into effect only when it would guarantee that outcome., it has been adopted by states and the District of Columbia, although it is suspended in Colorado. Together, they have electoral votes counting Colorado, which is of the Electoral College and of the 270 votes needed to give the compact legal force. Certain legal questions, however, may affect implementation of the compact.
Mechanism
Proposed in the form of an interstate compact, the agreement would go into effect among the participating states in the compact only after they collectively represent an absolute majority of votes in the Electoral College. In the next presidential election after adoption by the requisite number of states, the participating states would award all of their electoral votes to the candidate with the largest national popular vote total across the 50 states and the District of Columbia. As a result, that candidate would win the presidency by securing a majority of votes in the Electoral College. Until the compact's conditions are met, all states award electoral votes in their current manner.The compact would modify the way participating states implement of the U.S. Constitution, which requires each state legislature to define a method to appoint its electors to vote in the Electoral College. The Constitution does not mandate any particular legislative scheme for selecting electors, and instead vests state legislatures with the exclusive power to choose how to allocate their states' electors. States have chosen various methods of allocation over the years, with regular changes in the nation's early decades. Today, all but two states award all their electoral votes to the single candidate with the most votes statewide. Maine and Nebraska currently award one electoral vote to the winner in each congressional district, and their remaining two electoral votes to the state-wide winner.
The compact mandates a July 20 deadline every presidential election year, six months before Inauguration Day, to determine whether the agreement goes into effect for that particular election. A participating state may withdraw from the compact as long as it is before that deadline. The total number of electoral votes held by the participating states could also change due to congressional re-apportionment via the results of the U.S. Census or the admittance of a 51st state.
Motivation
Reasons given for the compact include:- The current Electoral College system allows a candidate to win the Presidency while losing the popular vote, as happened in the elections of 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016. In the 2000 election, for instance, Al Gore won 543,895 more votes nationally than George W. Bush, but Bush secured 5 more electors than Gore, in part due to a narrow Bush victory in Florida; in the 2016 election, Hillary Clinton won 2,868,691 more votes nationally than Donald Trump, but Trump secured 77 more electors than Clinton, in part due to narrow Trump victories in Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.
- State winner-take-all laws encourage candidates to focus disproportionately on a limited set of swing states, as small changes in the popular vote in those areas produce large changes in the electoral college vote. For example, in the 2016 election, a shift of 2,736 votes toward Donald Trump in New Hampshire would have produced a 4 electoral vote gain for his campaign. A similar shift in any other state would have produced no change in the electoral vote, thus encouraging the campaign to focus on New Hampshire above other states. A study by FairVote reported that the 2004 candidates devoted three quarters of their peak season campaign resources to just five states, while the other 45 states received very little attention. The report also stated that 18 states received no candidate visits and no TV advertising. This means that swing state issues receive more attention, while issues important to other states are largely ignored.
- State winner-take-all laws tend to decrease voter turnout in states without close races. Voters living outside the swing states have a greater certainty of which candidate is likely to win their state. This knowledge of the probable outcome decreases their incentive to vote. A report by the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate found that 2004 voter turnout in competitive swing states grew by 6.3% from the previous presidential election, compared to an increase of only 3.8% in noncompetitive states. A report by The Center for Information and Research on Civic Learning and Engagement found that turnout among eligible voters under age 30 was 64.4% in the ten closest battleground states and only 47.6% in the rest of the countrya 17% gap.
Debate
Protective function of Electoral College
Certain founders conceived of the Electoral College as a deliberative body which would weigh the inputs of the states, but not be bound by them, in selecting the president, and would therefore serve to protect the country from the election of a person who is unfit to be president. However, the Electoral College has never served such a role in practice. From 1796 onward, presidential electors have acted as "rubber stamps" for their parties' nominees. As of 2016, no election outcome has been determined by an elector deviating from the will of their state. Journalist and commentator Peter Beinart has cited the election of Donald Trump, whom some, he notes, view as unfit, as evidence that the Electoral College does not perform a protective function. Furthermore, thirty-two states and the District of Columbia have laws to prevent such "faithless electors", and such laws were upheld as constitutional by the Supreme Court in Chiafalo v. Washington. The National Popular Interstate Compact does not eliminate the Electoral College or affect faithless elector laws; it merely changes the way in which electors are pledged by the participating states.Campaign focus on swing states
Under the current system, campaign focus – as measured by spending, visits, and attention paid to regional or state issues – is largely limited to the few swing states whose electoral outcomes are competitive, with politically "solid" states mostly ignored by the campaigns. The adjacent maps illustrate the amount spent on advertising and the number of visits to each state, relative to population, by the two major-party candidates in the last stretch of the 2004 presidential campaign. Supporters of the compact contend that a national popular vote would encourage candidates to campaign with equal effort for votes in competitive and non-competitive states alike. Critics of the compact argue that candidates would have less incentive to focus on states with smaller populations or fewer urban areas, and would thus be less motivated to address rural issues.Disputed results and electoral fraud
Opponents of the compact have raised concerns about the handling of close or disputed outcomes. National Popular Vote contends that an election being decided on the basis of a disputed tally is far less likely under the NPVIC, which creates one large nationwide pool of voters, than under the current system, in which the national winner may be determined by an extremely small margin in any one of the fifty-one smaller statewide tallies. However, it is possible for the national popular vote to be closer than the vote tally within any one state. In the event of an exact tie in the nationwide tally, NPVIC member states will award their electors to the winner of the popular vote in their state. Under the NPVIC, each state will continue to handle disputes and statewide recounts as governed by their own laws. The NPVIC does not include any provision for a nationwide recount, though Congress has the authority to create such a provision.Pete du Pont argues that "Mr. Gore's 540,000-vote margin amounted to 3.1 votes in each of the country's 175,000 precincts. 'Finding' three votes per precinct in urban areas is not a difficult thing...". However, National Popular Vote contends that altering the outcome via electoral fraud would be more difficult under a national popular vote than under the current system, due to the greater number of total votes that would likely need to be changed: currently, a close election may be determined by the outcome in just one "tipping-point state", and the margin in that state is likely to be far smaller than the nationwide margin, due to the smaller pool of voters at the state level, and the fact that several states may have close results.
Suggested partisan advantage
Some supporters and opponents of the NPVIC believe it gives one party an advantage relative to the current Electoral College system. Former Delaware Governor Pete du Pont, a Republican, has argued that the compact would be an "urban power grab" and benefit Democrats. However, Saul Anuzis, former chairman of the Michigan Republican Party, wrote that Republicans "need" the compact, citing what he believes to be the center-right nature of the American electorate.A statistical analysis by FiveThirtyEight's Nate Silver of all presidential elections from 1864 to 2016 found that the Electoral College has not consistently favored one major party or the other, and that any advantage in the Electoral College does not tend to last long, noting that "there's almost no correlation between which party has the Electoral College advantage in one election and which has it four years later." Although in all four elections since 1876 in which the winner lost the popular vote, the Republican became president, Silver's analysis shows that such splits are about equally likely to favor either major party. A popular vote-Electoral College split favoring the Democrat John Kerry nearly occurred in 2004.
New Yorker essayist Hendrik Hertzberg also concluded that the NPVIC would benefit neither party, noting that historically both Republicans and Democrats have been successful in winning the popular vote in presidential elections.
State power relative to population
There is some debate over whether the Electoral College favors small- or large-population states. Those who argue that the College favors low-population states point out that such states have proportionally more electoral votes relative to their populations. In the least-populous states, with three electors, this results in voters having 143% greater voting power than they would under purely proportional allocation, while in the most populous state, California, voters' power is 16% smaller than under proportional allocation. The NPVIC would give equal weight to each voter's ballot, regardless of what state they live in. Others, however, believe that since most states award electoral votes on a winner-takes-all system, the potential of populous states to shift greater numbers of electoral votes gives them more clout than would be expected from their electoral vote count alone.Opponents of a national popular vote contend that the Electoral College is a fundamental component of the federal system established by the Constitutional Convention. Specifically, the Connecticut Compromise established a bicameral legislature – with proportional representation of the states in the House of Representatives and equal representation of the states in the Senate – as a compromise between less populous states fearful of having their interests dominated and voices drowned out by larger states, and larger states which viewed anything other than proportional representation as an affront to principles of democratic representation. The Electoral College extends the Connecticut Compromise from the Legislative Branch to the Executive Branch by assigning each state a number of electoral votes equal to their representation in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. A national popular vote, opponents argue, would create an imbalance in the federal system by keeping the Connecticut Compromise for the Legislative Branch and removing it from the Executive Branch. The ratio of the populations of the most and least populous states is far greater currently than when the Connecticut Compromise was adopted, exaggerating the non-proportional aspect of the compromise allocation.
Negation of state-level majorities
The three governors who have vetoed NPVIC legislation, Arnold Schwarzenegger of California, Linda Lingle of Hawaii, and Steve Sisolak of Nevada, objected to the compact on the grounds that it could require their states' electoral votes to be awarded to a candidate who did not win a majority in their state. Supporters of the compact counter that under a national popular vote system, state-level majorities are irrelevant; in any state, votes contribute to the nationwide tally, which determines the winner. The preferences of individual voters are thus paramount, while state-level majorities are an obsolete intermediary measure.Proliferation of candidates
Certain opponents of the compact contend that it would lead to a proliferation of third-party candidates, such that an election could be won with a plurality of as little as 15% of the vote. However, evidence from U.S. gubernatorial and other races in which a plurality results in a win do not bear out this suggestion. In the 975 general elections for Governor in the U.S. between 1948 and 2011, 90% of winners received more than 50% of the vote, 99% received more than 40%, and all received more than 35%. Duverger's law supports the contention that plurality elections do not generally create a proliferation of minor candidacies with significant vote shares.Legality
Constitutionality
Compact Clause
The of the United States Constitution states that "No State shall, without the Consent of Congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State". In a report released in October 2019, the Congressional Research Service cited the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Virginia v. Tennessee — reaffirmed in U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission and Cuyler v. Adams — as stating that the words "agreement" and "compact" are synonyms, and that explicit congressional consent of interstate compacts is not required for agreements "which the United States can have no possible objection or have any interest in interfering with". However, the report asserted, the Court required explicit congressional consent for interstate compacts that are "directed to the formation of any combination tending to the increase of political power in the States, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States" — meaning where the vertical balance of power between the federal government and state governments is altered in favor of state governments.The CRS report states that "Whether the NPV initiative requires congressional consent under the Compact Clause first requires a determination as to whether NPV even constitutes an interstate compact." Yale Law School professor Akhil Amar, one of the compact's framers, has argued that because the NPVIC does not create a "new interstate governmental apparatus" and because "cooperating states acting together would be exercising no more power than they are entitled to wield individually", the NPVIC probably does not constitute an interstate compact and cannot contravene the Compact Clause. Conversely, the CRS report cites the Court's opinion in Northeast Bancorp v. Federal Reserve Board of Governors as suggesting that a requirement of a new interstate governmental entity is a sufficient but not a necessary condition to qualify an agreement as being an interstate compact under the Compact Clause. Instead, the CRS report cites the Court's opinions in Virginia v. Tennessee and Northeast Bancorp as stating that any agreement between two or more states that "cover all stipulations affecting the conduct or claims of the parties", prohibits members from "modify or repeal unilaterally", and requires "'reciprocation' of mutual obligations" constitutes an interstate compact. Noting that the NPVIC meets all of those requirements, the CRS report concludes that "the initiative can be described as an interstate compact."
As part of concerns about whether the NPVIC would shift power from the federal government to state governments, at least two legal scholars have suggested that the NPVIC would require explicit congressional approval because it would remove the possibility of contingent elections for President being conducted by the U.S. House of Representatives under the 12th Amendment. The CRS report notes that only two presidential elections have been determined by a contingent election, and whether the loss of such elections would be a de minimis diminishment of federal power is unresolved by the relevant case law. The report does reference U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission as stating that the "pertinent inquiry is one of potential, rather than actual, impact on federal supremacy" in that the potential erosion of an enumerated power of the U.S. House of Representatives could arguably require congressional approval. Proponents of the compact counter that if removing the possibility of contingent elections is grounds for unconstitutionality, then Congress setting the size of the House at an odd number, as it did in 1911, was also unconstitutional.
The CRS report goes on to cite the Supreme Court's rulings in Florida v. Georgia and in Texas v. New Mexico and Colorado as recognizing that explicit congressional consent is also required for interstate compacts that alter the horizontal balance of power amongst state governments. University of Colorado Law School professor Jennifer S. Hendricks has argued that the NPVIC would not alter the power of non-compacting state governments because all state governments would retain their right to select the electors of their choosing. Bloomberg Law editor Michael Brody has argued that "the role of electors has yet to be defined by a court," and cites the Supreme Court ruling in Ray v. Blair as suggesting that the 12th Amendment does not require that electors must vote for the candidate to whom they are pledged. Brody notes that because the NPVIC only binds state legislatures and not electors, those electors would retain independent withdrawal power as faithless electors at the request of the compacting states, unless the compacting states adopt penalties or other statutes that bind the electors — which 11 of the 15 current member states and the District of Columbia currently do, in addition to 21 other states. On July 6, 2020, the Supreme Court decided the case Chiafalo v. Washington, ruling that state laws that sanction faithless electors, including removal or other penalties, are constitutional.
Other legal scholars have argued that the power of non-compacting states would be altered because, under the NPVIC, a state's power in determining the outcomes of presidential elections would be changed from the percentage of electors it has in the electoral college to the state's percentage of the popular vote, rendering the right of non-compacting state governments to appoint their own electors moot. Additionally, Ian J. Drake, an associate professor of political science and law at Montclair State University, has argued that because Cuyler v. Adams held that congressional approval of interstate compacts makes them federal laws, Congress cannot consent to the NPVIC without violating the Supremacy Clause, because under, Congress has no enumerated or implied powers to alter the presidential election process except as part of the constitutional amendment process. Labor lawyer Bradley T. Turflinger and the organizers of NPV Inc. dispute Drake's conclusion, and the NPV Inc. organizers have stated that they plan to seek congressional approval if the compact is approved by a sufficient number of states. Citing Drake, the CRS report concludes that if the NPVIC were to be enacted by the necessary number of states, it would likely become the source of considerable litigation, and it is likely that the Supreme Court will be involved in any resolution of the constitutional issues surrounding it.
Plenary power doctrine
Proponents of the compact, such as law professors Akhil and Vikram Amar, as well as U.S. Representative Jamie Raskin from Maryland's 8th congressional district, have argued that state legislatures have the plenary power to appoint electors in accordance with the national popular vote under the, which states that "Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress". Vikram Amar, along with other legal scholars, have also cited the Supreme Court's rulings in McPherson v. Blacker and Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission as recognizing that states have wide discretion in selecting the method by which they appoint their electors.However, the CRS report cites the Supreme Court's opinion in McPherson v. Blacker as stating that state legislatures have "conceded plenary power... in the matter of the appointment of electors," and citing the Court's opinions in Williams v. Rhodes and Oregon v. Mitchell that struck down state laws concerning the appointment of electors that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, the CRS report concludes that a state's power to select the method by which its electors are appointed is not absolute. Robert Natelson, a senior fellow at the libertarian Independence Institute in constitutional jurisprudence and a member of the conservative American Legislative Exchange Council's board of scholars, has also argued that a state legislature's power to appoint its electors cannot be absolute because otherwise states would be permitted to appoint their electors in a manner that would violate public trust. Natelson has also argued that US states' power to select electors must also be compatible in a substantive sense with the general US constitutional scheme for US presidential elections that gives smaller US states disproportionate weight relative to their population in selecting the US President. The NPVIC would allegedly be incompatible with this general US constitutional scheme as a substantive matter because it would de facto eliminate the disproportionate weight that smaller US states have relative to their population in selecting the US President.
Additionally, the CRS report notes that while the Court's opinion in McPherson v. Blacker emphasized that the variety of state laws that existed shortly after the ratification of the Constitution indicates that state legislatures have multiple alternative "modes of choosing the electors", the Court did not identify selecting electors in accordance with the results of the national popular vote as one of them. This is because, according to the CRS report, there appears to be no evidence contemporaneous with the ratification of the Constitution of a state selecting its electors in such a manner, and the CRS report cites the Court's opinion in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton as concluding that states cannot exercise their enumerated powers under Article I or Article II in a way that would "effect a fundamental change in the constitutional structure", a view at least three legal scholars have argued applies for the NPVIC.
''Chiafalo v. Washington''
On July 6, 2020 the Supreme Court unanimously ruled in the case Chiafalo v. Washington that it is within a state's power to pass laws that condition its appointment of electors or penalize so-called "faithless electors." This upheld the ruling from the 1892 case of McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 27, by stating, "Nothing in the Constitution expressly prohibits States from taking away presidential electors’ voting discretion as Washington does." While this is not a direct ruling on the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, it has the potential to apply precedent that states maintain the right to require their appointed electors to vote according to their state laws, or face sanctions such as removal or other penalties by the states.Voting Rights Act of 1965
A 2008 Columbia Law Review article by Columbia Law School student David Gringer suggested that the NPVIC could potentially violate Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. However, in 2012, the U.S. Justice Department Civil Rights Division declined to challenge California's entry into the NPVIC under Section 5 of the Act, and the October 2019 CRS report notes that the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Shelby County v. Holder, which invalidated Section 4 of the VRA, has rendered Section 5 currently inoperable. In response to Gringer's argument that the NPVIC would violate Section 2 of the VRA, FairVote's Rob Richie says that the NPVIC "treats all voters equally", and NPV Inc. has stated "The National Popular Vote bill manifestly would make every person's vote for President equal throughout the United States in an election to fill a single office. It is entirely consistent with the goal of the Voting Rights Act."History
Public support for Electoral College reform
Public opinion surveys suggest that a majority or plurality of Americans support a popular vote for President. Gallup polls dating back to 1944 showed consistent majorities of the public supporting a direct vote. A 2007 Washington Post and Kaiser Family Foundation poll found that 72% favored replacing the Electoral College with a direct election, including 78% of Democrats, 60% of Republicans, and 73% of independent voters.A November 2016 Gallup poll following the 2016 U.S. presidential election showed that Americans' support for amending the U.S. Constitution to replace the Electoral College with a national popular vote fell to 49%, with 47% opposed. Republican support for replacing the Electoral College with a national popular vote dropped significantly, from 54% in 2011 to 19% in 2016, which Gallup attributed to a partisan response to the 2016 result, where the Republican candidate won the Electoral College despite losing the popular vote. In March 2018, a Pew Research Center poll showed that 55% of Americans supported replacing the Electoral College with a national popular vote, with 41% opposed, but that a partisan divide remained in that support, as 75% of self-identified Democrats supported replacing the Electoral College with a national popular vote, while only 32% of self-identified Republicans did.
Proposals to abolish the Electoral College by amendment
Several proposals to abolish the Electoral College by constitutional amendment have been introduced in Congress over the decades. These efforts have, however, been hampered because a two-thirds vote in both the House and Senate are required to send an amendment to the states where ratification by three-fourths of the State legislatures or by conventions in three fourths of the states is required for it to become operative.Interstate compact plan
In 2001, Northwestern University law professor Robert W. Bennett suggested a plan in an academic publication to implement a National Popular Vote through a mechanism that would embrace state legislatures' power to appoint electors, rather than resist that power. By coordinating, states constituting a majority of the Electoral College could effectively implement a popular vote.Law professors Akhil Reed Amar and Vikram Amar defended the constitutionality of such a plan. They proposed that a group of states, through legislation, form a compact wherein they agree to give all of their electoral votes to the national popular vote winner, regardless of the balance of votes in their own state. These state laws would only be triggered once the compact included enough states to control a majority of the electoral college, thus guaranteeing that the national popular vote winner would also win the electoral college.
The academic plan uses two constitutional features:
- , Article 2, section 1, clause 2, which gives each state the power to determine the manner in which its electors are selected.
- Compact Clause, Article I, section 10, clause 3, under which it creates an enforceable compact.
Organization and advocacy
In 2006, John Koza, a computer science professor at Stanford, was the lead author of Every Vote Equal, a book that makes a detailed case for his plan for an interstate compact to establish National Popular Vote. That year, Koza, Barry Fadem and others formed National Popular Vote, a non-profit group to promote the legislation. The group has a transpartisan advisory committee including former US Senators Jake Garn, Birch Bayh, and David Durenberger, and former Representatives John Anderson, John Buchanan, and Tom Campbell.By the time of the group's opening news conference in February 2006, the proposed interstate compact had been introduced in the Illinois legislature. With backing from National Popular Vote, the NPVIC legislation was introduced in five additional state legislatures in the 2006 session. It passed in the Colorado Senate and in both houses of the California legislature before being vetoed by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger.
Adoption
In 2007, NPVIC legislation was introduced in 42 states. It was passed by at least one legislative chamber in Arkansas, California, Colorado, Illinois, New Jersey, North Carolina, Maryland, and Hawaii. Maryland became the first state to join the compact when Governor Martin O'Malley signed it into law on April 10, 2007.NPVIC legislation has been introduced in all 50 states., the NPVIC has been adopted by states and the District of Columbia. Together, they have electoral votes, which is of the Electoral College and of the 270 votes needed to give the compact legal force., no Republican governor has signed the NPVIC into law.
In Nevada, the legislation passed both chambers in 2019, but was vetoed by Gov. Steve Sisolak on May 30, 2019. In Maine, the legislation also passed both chambers in 2019, but failed the additional enactment vote in the House. States where only one chamber has passed the legislation are Arizona, Arkansas, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and Virginia. Bills seeking to repeal the compact in Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey and Washington have failed.
Initiatives and referendums
In Maine, an initiative to join the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact began collecting signatures on April 17, 2016. It failed to collect enough signatures to appear on the ballot. In Arizona, a similar initiative began collecting signatures on December 19, 2016, but failed to collect the required 150,642 signatures by July 5, 2018. In Missouri, an initiative did not collect the required number of signatures before the deadline of May 6, 2018.A referendum in Colorado seeking to overturn the state's adoption of the compact is scheduled to appear on the November 2020 ballot; that state's membership is suspended pending the outcome of the referendum.
Prospects
noted in 2014 that all jurisdictions that had adopted the compact at that time were blue states, and that there were not enough electoral votes from the remaining blue states to achieve the required majority. He concluded that, as swing states were unlikely to support a compact that reduces their influence, the compact could not succeed without adoption by some red states as well. Republican-led chambers have adopted the measure in New York, Oklahoma, and Arizona, and the measure has been unanimously approved by Republican-led committees in Georgia and Missouri, prior to the 2016 election.On March 15, 2019, Colorado became the first "purple" state to join the compact, though no Republican legislators supported the bill and Colorado had a state government trifecta under Democrats.
Based on population estimates, some states that have passed the compact are projected to lose one or two electoral votes due to congressional apportionment following the 2020 Census, which then might increase the number of additional states needed to adopt the measure.
Bills
Bills in latest session
The table below lists all state bills to join the NPVIC introduced or otherwise filed in a state's current or most recent legislative session. This includes all bills that are law, pending or have failed. The "EVs" column indicates the number of electoral votes each state has.| State | EVs | Session | Bill | Latest Action | Lower house | Upper house | Executive | Status |
| 3 | 2019–20 | SB 22 | ||||||
| 29 | 2020 | HB 335 | — | — | rowspan=2 | |||
| 29 | 2020 | SB 908 | — | — | - | |||
| 16 | 2019–20 | SB 42 | — | — | ||||
| 6 | 2019–20 | SB 115 | — | — | ||||
| 4 | 2019–20 | LD 418 | — | rowspan=5 | ||||
| 4 | 2019–20 | LD 816 | — | - | ||||
| 4 | 2019–20 | LD 816 | — | - | ||||
| 4 | 2019–20 | LD 816 | — | - | ||||
| 4 | 2019–20 | LD 816 | — | - | ||||
| 10 | 2019–20 | HF 1603 | — | — | rowspan=8 | |||
| 10 | 2019–20 | HF 1941 | — | — | - | |||
| 10 | 2019–20 | HF 2117 | — | — | - | |||
| 10 | 2019–20 | HF 3237 | — | — | - | |||
| 10 | 2019–20 | SF 34 | — | — | - | |||
| 10 | 2019–20 | SF 189 | — | — | - | |||
| 10 | 2019–20 | SF 2227 | — | - | ||||
| 10 | 2019–20 | SF 2984 | — | — | - | |||
| 6 | 2020 | HB 369 | — | — | ||||
| 10 | 2020 | HB 1591 | — | — | rowspan=3 | |||
| 10 | 2020 | HB 1949 | — | — | - | |||
| 10 | 2020 | HB 1988 | — | — | - | |||
| 4 | 2019–20 | HB 541 | — | — | ||||
| 15 | 2019–20 | SB 104 | — | — | ||||
| 18 | 2019–20 | HB 70 | — | — | ||||
| 20 | 2019–20 | SB 270 | — | — | ||||
| 9 | 2019–20 | H 3209 | — | — | rowspan=2 | |||
| 9 | 2019–20 | H 4277 | — | — | - | |||
| 13 | 2020–21 | HB 177 | — | rowspan=3 | ||||
| 13 | 2020–21 | HB 199 | — | — | - | |||
| 13 | 2020–21 | SB 399 | — | — | - | |||
| 5 | 2020 | HB 4575 | — | — | ||||
| 10 | 2019–20 | AB 185 | — | — | rowspan=2 | |||
| 10 | 2019–20 | SB 197 | — | — | - |