The Mont Blanc tunnel fire occurred on 24 March 1999. It was caused by a transport truck which caught fire while driving through the Mont Blanc Tunnel. Other vehicles travelling through the tunnel became trapped and fire crews were unable to reach the transport truck. Thirty-nine people were killed. In the aftermath, major changes were made to the tunnel to improve its safety.
Fire
On the morning of 24 March 1999, 39 people died when a Belgian transport truck carrying flour and margarine entered the French-side portal and caught fire in the tunnel. After several kilometres, the driver realized something was wrong as cars coming in the opposite direction flashed their headlights at him; a glance in his mirrors showed white smoke coming out from under his cabin. This was not yet a fire emergency; there had been 16 other truck fires in the tunnel over the previous 35 years, always extinguished on the spot by the drivers. At 10:53 CET, the driver of the vehicle, Gilbert Degrave, stopped in the middle of the tunnel to attempt to fight the fire but he was suddenly forced back by flames from his cabin. With Degrave unable to fight the fire, he was forced to flee. At 10:55, the tunnel employees triggered the fire alarm and stopped any further traffic from entering. At this point there were at least 10 cars and vans and 18 trucks in the tunnel that had entered from the French side. A few vehicles from the Italian side passed the Volvo truck without stopping. Some of the cars from the French side managed to turn around in the narrow two-lane tunnel to retreat back to France, but negotiating the road in the dense smoke that had rapidly filled the tunnel quickly made this impossible. The larger trucks did not have the space to turn around, and reversing out was not an option. Most drivers rolled up their windows and waited for rescue. The ventilation system in the tunnel drove toxic smoke back down the tunnel faster than anyone could run to safety. These fumes quickly filled the tunnel and caused vehicle engines to stall because of lack of oxygen. This included fire engines which, once affected, had to be abandoned by the firefighters. Many drivers near the blaze who attempted to leave their cars and seek refuge points were quickly overcome. Within minutes, two fire trucks from Chamonix responded to the unfolding disaster. The fire had melted the wiring and plunged the tunnel into darkness; in the smoke and with abandoned and wrecked vehicles blocking their path, the fire engines were unable to proceed. The fire crews instead abandoned their vehicles and took refuge in two of the emergency fire cubicles. As they huddled behind the fire doors, they could hear burning fuel roll down the road surface, causing tires and fuel tanks to explode. They were rescued five hours later by a third fire crew that responded and reached them via a ventilation duct; of the 15 firefighters that had been trapped, 14 were in serious condition and one died in the hospital. Some victims escaped to the fire cubicles. The original fire doors on the cubicles were rated to survive for two hours. Some had been upgraded in the 34 years since the tunnel was built to survive for four hours. The fire burned for 53 hours and reached temperatures of, mainly because of the margarine load in the trailer, equivalent to a oil tanker, which spread to other cargo vehicles nearby that also carried combustible loads. The fire trapped around 40 vehicles in dense and poisonous smoke. Due to weather conditions at the time, airflow through the tunnel was from the Italian side to the French side. Authorities compounded the effect by pumping in further fresh air from the Italian side, feeding the fire and forcing poisonous black smoke through the length of the tunnel. Only vehicles below the fire on the French side of the tunnel were trapped, while cars on the Italian side of the fire were mostly unaffected. There were 27 deaths in vehicles, and 10 more died trying to escape on foot. All the deceased were ultimately reduced to bones and ash. Of the initial 50 people trapped by the fire, 12 survived. It was more than five days before the tunnel cooled sufficiently to start repairs.
Aftermath
The tunnel underwent major changes in the three years it remained closed after the fire. Renovations include computerised detection equipment, extra security bays, a parallel escape shaft and a fire station in the middle of the tunnel complete with double cabbed fire trucks. The safety shafts also have clean air flowing through them via vents. Any people in the security bays now have video contact with the control centre, so they can communicate with the people trapped inside and inform them about what is happening in the tunnel more clearly. A remote site for cargo safety inspection was created on each side: Aosta in Italy and Passy-Le Fayet in France. Here all trucks are inspected well before the tunnel entrance. These remote sites are also used as staging areas, to smooth the peaks of commercial traffic. The experience gained from the investigation into the fire was one of the principal factors that led to the creation of the French Land Transport Accident Investigation Bureau. TV documentaries were also made concerning the disaster, all distributed worldwide and focussing on either safety aspects or the circumstances that turned what should have been a serious, but controllable incident into a disaster. The first, Seconds from Disaster – Tunnel Inferno, was a reconstruction of the events leading up to and during the disaster and the conclusions of the investigation that followed. The second, Into the Flames – Fire Underground, revisited the circumstances and showed how new technology in the form of a new type of fire extinguisher could have reduced the scale of the disaster and enabled the fire service to reach and remain in the vicinity to fight the fire.
Manslaughter trial
In Grenoble, France, 16 people and companies were tried on 31 January 2005 for manslaughter. Defendants in the trial included:
Gilbert Degrave, the Belgian driver of the truck that caused the fire
The cause of the fire is disputed. One account reported it to be a cigarette stub carelessly thrown at the truck, which supposedly entered the engine induction snorkel above the cabin, setting the paper air filter on fire. Others blamed a mechanical or electrical fault, or poor maintenance of the truck's engine. The closest smoke detector was out of order, and French emergency services did not use the same radio frequency as those inside the tunnel. The Italian company responsible for operating the tunnel, SITMB, paid €13.5 million to a fund for the families of the victims. Édouard Balladur, former president of the French company operating the tunnel, and later Prime Minister of France, underwent a witnesses examination. He was asked about the security measures that he ordered to or did not order to be carried out. Balladur claimed that the catastrophe could be attributed to the fact the tunnel had been divided into two sections operated by two companies, which failed to coordinate the situation. On 27 July 2005, thirteen defendants were found guilty, and handed sentences ranging from fines to suspended prison sentences, to six months in jail:
Gérard Roncoli, the head of security at the tunnel, was convicted and sentenced to six months in jail plus an additional two-year suspended sentence, the heaviest sentence levied against any of the defendants. The sentence was upheld on appeal.
Remy Chardon, former president of the French company operating the tunnel, was convicted and received two-year suspended jail term and a fine of approximately US$18,000.
Gilbert Degrave, the driver of the truck, received a four-month suspended sentence.
Seven other people, including the tunnel's Italian security chief, were handed suspended terms and fines.
