Luxair Flight 9642 was a scheduled international passenger flight flying from Berlin Tempelhof Airport, Germany, to Luxembourg Findel Airport, Luxembourg. The flight carried 19 passengers and 3 crew members. The flight was operated by Luxair, the flag carrier of Luxembourg. The plane was a Fokker 50 and registered as LX-LGB. Lufthansa had a codeshare on the flight as LH2420. On 6 November 2002, the flight crashed while on final approach to Luxembourg Findel Airport about short of the runway while trying to land in fog. 20 out of the 22 passengers and crew perished. The crash is the deadliest aviation disaster to occur in Luxembourg.
Accident
The crews were approaching Findel Airport in foggy conditions.
09:02:57 ATC : « Luxair 9642 good morning, continue approach. The wind is calm RVR beginning 250 meters, mid section 250 meters, stop end 225 meters».
09:03:08 Flight 9642 : «That’s copied Luxair 9642… but we need 300 meters for the approach».
09:03:18 ATC : «9642 copied… uh so continue approach and I’ll keep you advised we didn’t have 300 uh… uh during the last time ».
09:03:28 Flight 9642 : «Euh Roger 9642, we keep you advised we’re proceeding to ELU now and … uh standing by 9642».
The flight crews decided to go-around, but then they later aborted the go-around and continued their approach.
09:04:46 Flight 9642 : «Yes, well we do a go-around, missed approach».
09:05:05 Flight 9642 : «9642 Roger so we continue».
09:05:08 ATC : «9642 you are cleared to land, wind 180°….knots».
The co-pilot later acknowledged this message. It was the last communication with the ATC. As the landing gear retracted, the pitch angle of the two propellers simultaneously reached a value that is lower than the minimum values for flight. This setting caused the aircraft's speed and altitude to decrease rapidly. A few seconds later, both engines stopped and the flight data recorders ceased functioning. The first impact marks are found on the south edge of the road RN1. They represent the two main landing gears and the fuselage tail cone. The left wing tip scratched across the road before hitting an embankment at the northside of the road RN1. Both wheels and blades came off from the aircraft. The aircraft bounced. At this point, the empennage and part of the right wing broke away, the aft portion of the fuselage turned around to the right and the aircraft came to rest further away. At 09:05:42, the aircraft disappeared from the radar screen. It was immediately found that the aircraft had crashed in a field to the north of runway centreline. The fog was so thick that nearby residents were unaware of the crash. Most of them claimed not to have seen or even heard anything when the crash occurred, and only realized that something had happened nearby when ambulances and emergency services arrived at the crash site. Rescue services found passengers had been ejected from the cabin. Some passengers were still attached to their seat and others were not. The cabin crew member was found in the corridor next to the fuselage front entrance. Due to the cockpit not catching fire the captain survived. He was trapped in the cockpit and rescuers cut a hole to retrieve him.
Passengers
Most of the passengers were business officials from Germany. Seventeen were found dead at the crash site with five survivors, but three dying in the hospital. By nightfall, 18 bodies out of the 20 dead were found, while the other two remained missing. The bodies were thought to be buried under the smoldering fuselage. Rescue workers were using a crane to disentangle the charred remains. Amongst the passengers killed on the flight was artist Michel Majerus. The Captain, was 26-year-old Claude Poeckes, who had a total flying experience of 4,242 flight hours and 2,864 hours on type. The First Officer was 32-year-old John Arendt with a total flight hours of 1,156 and 443 hours on type.
Nationalities of passengers and crew
Investigation
The aircraft was inspected by a maintenance crew on the evening before the flight. While the aircraft passed inspection, it was found out that the aircraft's antiskid system on the right hand landing gear was inoperative. This had previously been an issue with the system and was detected on 27 September 2002 being replaced after. However, on 24 October 2002, the same antiskid system was inoperative again. Despite changing the outboard wheel speed sensor, the system remained inoperative. On 5 November 2002, one day before the accident, the problem was solved by replacing the inboard wheel speed sensor. Investigators noted that the weather around the airport at the time of the accident was foggy. Nearby residents of Niederanven stated that the fog at the time of the accident was very thick, so much that nearby residents couldn't see or even hear the moment of impact, even though Niederanven was in close proximity to the crash site.
CVR analysis
According to analysis of the Cockpit Voice Recorder, the flight was cleared for the approach as it descended through 6000 ft at a distance of thirteen nautical miles from the airport. The crew expressed some surprise that they were cleared to land ahead of all aircraft in the holding pattern, but began to prepare the aircraft for approach and landing. The preparation process was abbreviated due to the crew being caught off guard by the landing priority given to them. At 09:02:12, the captain told the First Officer: "Tell him … that if we don’t have 300 meters at Echo, we are going to perform a go-around". This message was never delivered to ATC because the flight was transmitting on the tower frequency at this time. The Captain decided to perform a go-around. However, the copilot did not react and instead continued with the approach checklist, placing the ground idle stop in the OFF position, this being the last action on the checklist. This misunderstanding resulted from the lack of preparation for the approach. While the captain ordered a go-around, the crew did begin the process, and so the decision did not result in significant action. Instead, the crew realized that they had deviated from the Standard Operating Procedures. This seems to have caused confusion in the cockpit. Although the Captain continued the approach, he didn't call for flaps and gear. In addition, he waited for several seconds before putting the aircraft into descent. The captain, faced now with a sudden time pressure and all mechanical locks being removed, and with his hand on the power levers, may have unintentionally moved the power levers further backwards, passing through the ground idle position, towards full reverse. This shift to reverse power triggered a propeller overspeed that was heard and noticed by the crew. Feeling a tremendous increase in drag and a sudden deceleration, one of the crew members retracted the flaps. The power levers were then moved forward, but it was too late. A few seconds later, the aircraft crashed into the ground.
Cause
The investigation found that a series of non-standard actions resulted in severe loss of airspeed due to the accidental selection of the propellers into reverse pitch. The aircraft subsequently impacted short of the runway. Contributing to the accident were errors concerning the implementation of a safety recommendation which had been made by the manufacturer to Fokker 50 operators.
Aftermath
A criminal prosecution was launched but was delayed until 10 October 2011. Captain Poecks, three former Luxair executives, and three mechanics were all charged with involuntary manslaughter and negligence. The executives were later acquitted. On 27 March 2012, the remaining defendants were all found guilty. Captain Poecks was sentenced to 42 months of probation and to pay a fine of 4000 euros. The three mechanics were sentenced to 18 months, two years, and four years of probation respectively, and to pay fines of 2,000 to 2,500 euros. In January 2014, the families of four of the victims received 21,000 to 130,000 euros in compensation. In February the same year, the attorneys of the convicted appealed the court's verdict. In May 2015, a court paid 310,000 euros in compensation to the families of three German victims.
