Irish Boundary Commission
The Irish Boundary Commission met in 1924–25 to decide on the precise delineation of the border between the Irish Free State and Northern Ireland. The 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, which ended the Irish War of Independence, provided for such a commission if Northern Ireland chose to secede from the Irish Free State, an event that occurred as expected two days after the Free State's inception on 6 December 1922. The governments of the United Kingdom, of the Irish Free State and of Northern Ireland were to nominate one member each to the commission. When the Northern government refused to cooperate, the British government assigned a Belfast newspaper editor to represent Northern Irish interests.
The provisional border in 1922 was that which the Government of Ireland Act 1920 made between Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. Most Irish nationalists hoped for a considerable transfer of land to the Free State, on the basis that most border areas had nationalist majorities. However, the Commission recommended relatively small transfers, and in both directions. This was leaked to The Morning Post in 1925, causing protests from both unionists and nationalists.
In order to avoid the possibility of further disputes, the British, Free State, and Northern Ireland governments agreed to suppress the overall report, and on 3 December 1925, instead of any changes being made, the existing border was confirmed by W. T. Cosgrave for the Free State, Sir James Craig for Northern Ireland, and Stanley Baldwin for the British government, as part of a wider agreement which included a resolution of outstanding financial disagreements. This was then ratified by their three parliaments. The commission's report was not published until 1969.
Provisional border (1920–25)
The Government of Ireland Act 1920 was enacted during the height of the War of Independence and partitioned the island into two separate Home Rule territories of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, to be called Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland. In its determination of this border, the Parliament of the United Kingdom heard the arguments of the Irish Unionist Party, but not those of most of the elected representatives of the Irish nationalist population. Sinn Féin refused to recognise any legitimate role of that Parliament in Irish affairs and declined to attend it, leaving only the Irish Parliamentary Party, whose representation at Westminster had been reduced to minuscule size at the 1918 General Election, present at the debates. James Craig's brother told the British House of Commons unambiguously that the six northeastern counties were the largest possible area that unionists could "hold".Boundary Commission's ambiguous terms
Article 12 of the Anglo-Irish Treaty included dealing with the possible establishment of a Boundary Commission. It has been said that:Article 12 describes the commission in the following terms:
Accordingly, in 1922 the new Free State established the North-Eastern Boundary Bureau, a government office which by 1925 had prepared 56 boxes of files to argue its case for areas of Northern Ireland to be transferred to the Free State.
In March 1922 the three governments signed the "Craig–Collins Agreement", an attempt to end the conflict in Northern Ireland. Despite Article 12 of the Treaty, this agreement envisaged a two-party conference between the Northern Ireland government and the Provisional Government of Southern Ireland to establish: " a. Whether means can be devised to secure the unity of Ireland" and "b. Failing this, whether agreement can be arrived at on the boundary question otherwise than by recourse to the Boundary Commission outlined in Article 12 of the Treaty". However, this agreement quickly broke down for reasons other than the boundary question.
The Commission
Due to the delay caused by the Irish Civil War, the commission was appointed in 1924. The Northern Ireland government, which adopted a policy of refusing to cooperate with the Commission since it did not wish to lose any territory, refused to appoint a representative. To resolve this the first Labour Government in the United Kingdom and the Irish Free State government legislated to allow the UK Government to appoint a representative on their behalf. The commission was convened in 1925 consisting of:- Justice Richard Feetham of South Africa as Chairman
- Eoin MacNeill, Minister for Education
- Joseph R. Fisher, a Unionist newspaper editor, author and barrister
Boundary Commission report leak
On 7 November 1925 an English Conservative newspaper, The Morning Post, published leaked notes of the negotiations, including a draft map. The overall effects of the Boundary Commission's recommendations would have been the transfer of 286 square miles to the Free State and 77 square miles to Northern Ireland. The leaked report included, accurately, the Boundary Commission recommendation that parts of east Donegal would be transferred to Northern Ireland. Only 1 in every 25 Northern Irish Catholics would have been placed under Free State rule. The Boundary Commission's recommendations would have shortened the border by 51 miles.The Boundary Commission's recommendations, as reported in The Morning Post were seen as an embarrassment in Dublin. There they were perceived as being contrary to the overarching purpose of the commission, which they considered was to award the more Nationalist parts of Northern Ireland to the Free State. MacNeill withdrew from the commission on 20 November and resigned his cabinet post on 24 November. Despite withdrawing, MacNeill then voted in favour of the settlement on 10 December.
Intergovernmental agreement November–December 1925
The press leak effectively ended the commission's work. After McNeill's resignation Fisher and Feetham, the remaining commissioners, continued their work without MacNeill. The publication of the commission's award would have an immediate legal effect, so the Free State government quickly entered into talks with the British and Northern Ireland governments. In late November members of the Irish government visited London and Chequers to go over the ground since the Treaty and to consider the exact meaning of Article 12.- The Irish view was that it was only intended to award areas within the six counties of Northern Ireland to the Free State.
- The British view was that the entire 1920 boundary was adjustable in either direction, as the Irish side had insisted in the 1921 Treaty that Northern Ireland was deemed part of Ireland until it voted to secede in December 1922, but that the net balance of property and people transferred either way would benefit the Free State.
In the background, under the terms of Article 5 of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty the Irish Free State had agreed to pay its share of the Imperial debt:
This had not been paid by 1925, in part due to the heavy costs incurred in and after the Irish Civil War of 1922–23. The main essence of the intergovernmental agreement was that the 1920 boundary would stay as it was, and, in return, the UK would not demand payment of the amount agreed under the Treaty. Since 1925 this payment was never made, nor demanded.
The Irish historian Diarmaid Ferriter suggested a more complex tradeoff; the debt obligation was removed from the Free State and non-publication of the report, in return for the Free State dropping its claim to rule some Catholic/nationalist areas of Northern Ireland. Each side could blame the other side for the outcome. W. T. Cosgrave admitted that the security of the Catholic minority depended on the goodwill of their neighbours.
The economist John Fitzgerald argued that writing off the share of the UK debt in one transaction was also considerably better than servicing its costs for an unlimited time into the future, as stipulated by the treaty. The effect would be to sever an unwelcome and burdensome link between Britain and the Free State, enhancing Irish independence. Irish debt-to-GNP fell from 90% to 10%.
The final agreement between the Irish Free State, Northern Ireland, and the United Kingdom was signed on 3 December 1925. Later that day the agreement was read out by Stanley Baldwin in the House of Commons. The agreement was enacted by the "Ireland Act" that was passed unanimously by the British parliament on 8–9 December. Effectively the agreement was concluded by the three governments, and the Commission then rubber-stamped it, so the publication, or not, of the commission's report became an irrelevance. The Agreement was then formally registered with the League of Nations on 8 February 1926.
Dáil debates on the Commission, 7–10 December 1925
In the Dáil debates on the outcome on 7 December 1925, Cosgrave mentioned that the sum due under the Imperial debt had not yet been fixed, but was estimated at £5–19 million annually, the UK having a debt of over £7 billion. The Free State's annual budget was then about £25 million. Cosgrave's aim was to eliminate this amount: "I had only one figure in my mind and that was a huge nought. That was the figure I strove to get, and I got it." Cosgrave also hoped that the large nationalist minority in Northern Ireland would be a bridge between Belfast and Dublin.On the final day of debate, Cosgrave revealed that one of the reasons for independence, the elimination of poverty caused by London's over-taxation of Ireland, had not been solved even after four years of freedom:
His main opponent was William Magennis from Northern Ireland, who particularly objected that the Council of Ireland was not mentioned.
The government side felt that a boundary of some sort, and partition, had been on the cards for years. If the boundary was moved towards Belfast it would be harder to eliminate in the long term. Kevin O'Higgins pondered:
On 9 December a deputation of Irish nationalists from Northern Ireland arrived to make their views known to the Dáil, but were turned away.
After 4 days of heated debate on the "Treaty Bill, 1925", the boundary agreement was approved on 10 December by a Dáil vote of 71 to 20. On 16 December the Irish Senate approved by 27 votes to 19.
Non-publication of the report
Both the Irish President of the Executive Council and the Northern Ireland Prime Minister agreed in the negotiations on 3 December to bury the report as part of a wider intergovernmental settlement. The remaining Commissioners discussed the matter with the politicians at length, and expected publication within weeks. However, W. T. Cosgrave said that he:..believed that it would be in the interests of Irish peace that the Report should be burned or buried, because another set of circumstances had arrived, and a bigger settlement had been reached beyond any that the Award of the Commission could achieve.
Sir James Craig added that:
If the settlement succeeded it would be a great disservice to Ireland, North and South, to have a map produced showing what would have been the position of the persons on the Border had the Award been made. If the settlement came off and nothing was published, no-one would know what would have been his fate. He himself had not seen the map of the proposed new Boundary. When he returned home he would be questioned on the subject and he preferred to be able to say that he did not know the terms of the proposed Award. He was certain that it would be better that no-one should ever know accurately what their position would have been.
For differing reasons the British government and the remaining two Commissioners agreed with these views. Even this inter-governmental discussion about suppressing the report remained a secret for decades.