Dhola Post
Dhola Post was a border post set up by the Indian Army in June 1962, in the Namka Chu river valley area disputed by China and India, north of the McMahon Line and south of the Thagla Ridge. On 20 September, the post was attacked by Chinese forces from the Thagla Ridge to the north, and sporadic fighting continued till 20 October when an all-out attack was launched by China leading to the Sino-Indian War. Facing an overwhelming force, the Indian Army evacuated the Dhola Post as well as the entire area of Tawang, retreating to Sela and Bomdila.
Location and background
The disputed territory is the area adjacent to the Nyamjang Chu river, which originates in Tibet and flows into Indian-controlled Assam Himalayan region.The map attached to the 1914 Simla Convention, displaying the border between Tibet and the Assam Himalayan region, showed a straight line border running east–west in the vicinity of the Nyamjang Chu river, cutting across a ridge called Tsangdhar. Immediately to the north of Tsangdhar ridge is a higher Thagla Ridge. The Namka Chu river, long, flows in the valley between the two ridges, west to east, joining Nyamjang Chu at the bottom.
At the foot of the Thagla Ridge in the Nyamjang Chu valley, about 2.5 km north from the mouth of Namkha Chu, is a grazing ground called Khinzemane. At the northeastern tip of the ridge is located the Tibetan village of Le. The villagers of Le as well as those of the village Lumpo to the south are said to have traditionally used the Khinzemane grazing ground. The Indian government claimed that the grazing ground belonged to Lumpo and the villagers of Le had to pay rent to Lumpo for its use.
The Indians held that the boundary was supposed to follow the Himalayan watershed, which was clearly on the Thagla Ridge. They believed that the 1914 map incorrectly depicted the border due to inadequate exploration at that time and that the correct border was on the Thagla Ridge. In 1959, India had placed a post at Khinzemane at the foot of the Thagla Ridge. The Chinese forces attacked it and forced it to retreat. After some exchanges in the diplomatic channels,
India reinstated the post. During the officials' level border negotiations between the India and China in 1960, the issue was thoroughly discussed, even though it did not result in any agreement. China continued to maintain that Khinzemane was Chinese territory.
Establishment
In late 1961, India settled on what came to be called a 'forward policy' to circumvent the Chinese expansion into the disputed areas, asking its Army to "go as far as practicable... and be in effective occupation of the whole frontier". In the northeast frontier, Assam Rifles was tasked with setting up posts all along the McMahon Line. The Dhola Post came into being as part of this effort.The Dhola Post was located on the northern slopes of the Tsangdhar ridge, close to the Namkha Chu valley, at about 300 metres above the level of the river. The Indian official history of the war states that the post was able to dominate the Namkha Chu valley, but it was itself dominated by the Thagla Ridge to the north. The terrain was extremely difficult: thickly wooded mountain slopes led to the area via walking tracks in narrow gorges. The closest inhabitable place was the village of Lumpo at a distance of. The posts had to be supplied by air and the nearest air drop location was on top of the Tsangdhar ridge.
A walking track was established along the mountain slope facing the Namjyang Chu valley, leading from Lumpo to a depression called Hatung La on the Tangdhar ridge. At an intermediate location called Zirkhim a helipad was constructed. The villages of Lumpo and Zemithang also had helipads, the latter able to take MI-4 Russian helicopters.
The army officer who commanded the Assam Rifles platoon, Captain Mahabir Prasad, questioned the siting of the post immediately after returning to base. He informed the Divisional Headquarters that, according to the local Intelligence Bureau sources, the Chinese knew about the Dhola Post and regarded the location as Chinese territory. They would be ready to occupy it as soon as they received orders. The Divisional Commander, Maj. Gen. Niranjan Prasad, queried the higher officers whether the territory was properly Indian, but did not receive a response. His superior, Lt. Gen. Umrao Singh commanding the XXXIII Corps, expressed his own doubts about the legality of the territory, which were also greeted with no response. Eventually the matter was referred to Sarvepalli Gopal heading the Historical Division of the Ministry of External Affairs, who answered in the affirmative, citing the Officials' Report. But before the information trickled down to the commanders, matters came to a head.
Indian hesitations
When General Prasad, the divisional commander, did not receive a reply to his query about the boundary, he assessed that it made tactical sense to occupy the Thagla Ridge preemptively. He sought permission from the Army headquarters to do so. Before the headquarters made up its mind, the Chinese occupied the Thagla Ridge on 8 September 1962. Scholars find the inefficiencies of the Army command responsible for the Indian inaction, but at the same time the lack of clarity on where the border lay and indecision on how far to go in confronting the Chinese seem to have played a role. In contrast, the Chinese moved decisively.Having occupied the Thagla Ridge, the Chinese entered the Namka Chu valley on the southwestern side of the ridge and threatened the Dhola Post. The Indian Army high command saw the Chinese action as an attempt to replicate in Assam Himalaya the kind of encroachments they were already conducting in Aksai Chin. It was felt that a show of determination was called for to forestall any further encroachments; a 'no alternative' situation, in the words of scholar Steven Hoffmann. Indeed, the opposition parties were vying for blood. The Swatantra Party led by Rajagopalachari asked for Nehru's resignation. In a meeting chaired by defence minister Krishna Menon, it was decided that India would use force "to expel the Chinese from the south of the Thagla ".
The Army headquarters ordered 7th Infantry Brigade to move to Dhola to deal with the Chinese investment of the post. The local commanders thought the operation to be utterly infeasible. Umrao Singh argued that the Chinese could easily outstrip any effort by India to induct new troops into the area since they had a roadhead leading to their positions. He recommended withdrawing the Dhola Post to the south of the map-marked McMahon Line. He was overruled by General L. P. Sen, in charge of the Eastern Command. In Sen's view any intrusion into Indian territory was unacceptable to the Indian government and the intrusion must be thrown out by force.
Fighting broke out on 20 September and continued for ten days. L. P. Sen asked for plans for dislodging the Chinese from the Thagla Ridge. The corps commander, who thought it infeasible, produced logistical requirements that were impossible to meet. Sen asked the high command for Umrao Singh to be replaced. The high command divested Umrao Singh's XXXIII Corps of responsibility for Assam Himalaya, and gave it to IV Corps. The Chief of General Staff B. M. Kaul was asked to head the new formation. IV Corps' troops in the area were inadequate and Kaul is said to have lacked combat experience.