The principle of command and obedience in the Bundeswehr, along with the concept of "citizens in uniform", was central to the 1953 idea of "leadership development and civic education". The revised definition of military orders and obedience, as well as superior-subordinate relations by the former "Amt Blank", was a 1950s result of Nazi German excesses. Central aims were the reduction of power to command by superiors and a shared responsibility for obedience by subordinates.
An instruction might be a military order, if a soldier was a defined military superior by the Ministerial Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations. If an order was given by someone not a military superior, it would be juridically called a "military non-order". Fundamentally, a superior is responsible for his orders and obligated to implement his instructions. He may only give orders concerning official aims and respecting international and national laws and the general directives issued by the Ministry. He is fundamentally responsible for the consequences of his orders. Whenever possible, military orders should include a description of the task and its aim. This is known as Auftragstaktik, and would enable subordinates to act to achieve the order's aim in changed circumstances.
Superior-subordinate relations
The command relationships in the Bundeswehr are defined in the Ministerial Directive Governing Superior-Subordinate Relations. These service regulations were decreed March 19, 1956, shortly before the first soldiers joined the newly founded Bundeswehr, and went into effect June 7, 1956. They were modified by decree October 7, 1981. The Vorgesetztenverordnung applies only to Bundeswehr soldiers and does not apply to civilian personnel of the Bundeswehr. Superior-subordinate relations of civilian Bundeswehr members are defined by other regulations and ordinances. The content of the Vorgesetztenverordnung is one of the first things that recruits are required to learn.
Superior positions
§§ 1-3 VorgV concern the assignment of a superior. It is possible for a soldier to be superior to another in several ways. The following types of superiors are defined: Not mentioned in the Vorgesetztenverordnung, but recognized in practice, is "superiorship by consent of the subordinates": If no other superior is on site and either the situation is not an emergency, or none of those involved is at least an NCO, then the soldier with the highest rank on site or one of them if several can command if the others don't object.
Contradictory orders
If a subordinate receives an order contrary to an already-received order, he must inform the superior who gave the second order of this. On the basis of this knowledge, the second superior would have responsibility to verify the given order and decide whether or not the subordinate had to obey his order. The subordinate must obey the last given order, if the second one is not canceled; this is necessary because the second superior may have new information about a changed situation. If a subordinate has not been able to execute the first order because of the second order, he must inform the first superior as soon as possible. The subordinate is immune from punishment by him, because the second superior is responsible for his order.
Prioritization (in opposing superior relationships)
It may be possible for two soldiers to be superior to each other due to differing paragraphs of the Vorgesetztenverordnung. For such situations the following :wikt:prioritization|prioritization of relationship importance is defined: § 6 VorgV is excluded because a commissioned officer could only declare himself superior if there was no superior to him at the scene.
Obedience and disobedience
Duty of obedience
Above all, subordinates must obey their superiors and must inform superiors of non-executed orders or unreached aims. Subordinates must execute military orders:
Although a superior must verify his orders, the recipient must also do so. First he would have to verify whether an instruction was given by a defined military superior according to the Vorgesetztenverordnung. If not, it would not be a military order with claim to obedience. If he executed this "military non-order", he would be responsible for possible consequences. If the instruction is given by a military superior, he must verify whether he must obey, may obey, or must refuse to obey. Generally he has to obey. He may but need not obey if the order has obviously no legitimate aim, violates the soldier's ownhuman dignity, or is unconscionable. He must not obey if the order violates others' human dignity, international law or consists of a crime. Otherwise, subordinates are guilty of their deeds if their criminal character was obvious to them. Obviously-unavoidable errors may remain unpunished. Apart from that, it is not the soldier's job to investigate the entire legitimacy of the order; e. g. whether the not obviously lacking official aim actually existed, or whether non-penal laws or directives of the Ministry were complied with. In particular, a soldier must obey to commit a contravention. In these cases, the commanding superior has the entire responsibility for the act. It might, though, be comradely to bring an error to the superior's attention, and the soldier is not to be punished for doing so.
Penalties for disobedience and insubordination
Punishment for disobedience is regulated in the Wehrstrafgesetz. Germany does not have any military courts; civilian courts have jurisdiction over military law. Subordinates who do not execute military orders with claim to obedience may be punished with imprisonment up to three years. "Severe consequences" means that the result of the disobedience either would have grave consequences for the security of Germany or for the combat worthiness of the forces, or that it caused death or severe bodily harm to another person. Insubordination is the oral or physical revolt against military orders or the denial of an order, and may be punished with imprisonment up to three years. In case of an initial revolt against a military order, a court could withhold sentencing if the subordinate executed the order voluntarily and in time afterwards. If subordinates avoided executing orders frivolously, they could also be sentenced to imprisonment up to two years in cases of severe consequences.
