The Clayton Tunnelrail crash occurred on Sunday 25 August 1861, five miles from Brighton on the south coast of England. At the time it was the worst accident on the British railway system. A train ran into the back of another inside the tunnel, killing 23 and injuring 176 passengers. Three north-bound trains left Brighton station within a few minutes of one another. At the southern entrance to Clayton Tunnel an automatic signal failed to return to danger after the first train passed, allowing the second train to follow it into the tunnel. The signaller at the south end of the tunnel belatedly waved a red flag in an attempt to stop the second train, but thought that it had not been seen. However the driver of the second train had briefly glimpsed the flag and stopped his train inside the tunnel. The signaller then misinterpreted a 'line clear' telegraph message from the signal box at the north end of the tunnel as referring to the second train instead of the first, and signalled the third train into the tunnel.
Circumstances
Signalman Henry Killick had an alarm bell linked to a signal, a needle telegraph and a clock in his cabin, close to the south entrance of the tunnel. He could control the signal by a wheel in the cabin, but it would normally be at "danger" unless he approved a train to enter the tunnel. When a train passed, the signal returned automatically to "danger", but if it did not, the alarm bell would ring. The telegraph was linked to the north signal box, and would show there was a train in the tunnel if the signalman at the other box activated it by pressing and holding down a switch. Otherwise the needle would hang vertically. Except for the Clayton Tunnel, the line was worked on the time-interval system, requiring trains on the same track to be separated by 5 minutes. Despite this, the three trains actually left Brighton within 7 minutes:
At the tunnel mouth, the first train passed the signal at "clear", but the alarm bell rang to warn Killick that it had not returned to "danger". He sent a "train in tunnel" message to Brown in the north cabin, but did not return the signal to "danger" in time to stop the second train from passing the signal and travelling to the tunnel. It was only 3 minutes behind, and may well have caught up with the first train. Realising that the first train was still in the tunnel, he rushed out of the cabin waving his red flag to stop the second train just as it was passing. He could not be sure that the driver had seen the flag, however. He telegraphed Brown "is tunnel clear?" At that moment, the first train cleared the tunnel, so Brown signalled back "tunnel clear" to Killick. But unfortunately, Killick thought that Brown was referring to the second train and not the first. In fact the second train's driver had seen the red flag and stopped about half a mile into the tunnel, and was reversing back to return to the south end. Meanwhile, Killick saw the third train approaching and stopping at his signal; thinking that the tunnel was clear, he waved his white flag for it to proceed. The second and third trains then collided in the tunnel with great force. The second train was pushed forward, and the locomotive obliterated the guard's van at the rear before smashing into the last carriage. It then rode up over the carriage roof and smashed its chimney against the tunnel roof before stopping. Many of the 23 deaths were in this last carriage, where passengers were burnt or scalded to death by the broken engine. The bodies of a number of the victims were stored temporarily in the cellar of The Hassocks Hotel. A nine-day inquest was held at Brighton town hall into the deaths of the 23 victims. It concluded with the jury giving a verdict of manslaughter against Charles Legg, the assistant stationmaster of Brighton station, finding him negligent by starting three trains so close together. The jury did not find any negligence by either signalmen Killick or Brown. Legg was committed for trial for manslaughter, but found not guilty.
Causes
The catastrophe publicised the problem of trains travelling too close together, with signalmen having to appraise the situation too quickly for safety's sake. A simple communication mistake between the two signal boxes caused havoc that Sunday, but the telegraph was also blamed for the tragedy because it did not register without continual pressure on the switch. The signal, too, was also at fault for not returning to "danger" immediately after the train had passed. The accident encouraged the use of the block system for the remainder of the railway system. One other aspect of this accident was that Signalman Killick was working a continuous 24-hour shift that day, rather than the regulation 18 hours to gain a complete day off duty. In his report on the accident Captain Tyler stated that "it was disgraceful that a man in so responsible a position as Signalman Killick should be compelled to work for twenty-four hours at a stretch in order to earn one day of rest a week." Charles Dickens may have partly based his story "The Signal-Man" on this accident, dramatising the events, as well as adding other incidents. His own experience at the Staplehurst rail crash may have inspired him to write this ghost story. Readers of the story in December 1866 would likely have still remembered the Clayton accident.
Similar accidents
Other accidents in which the signalman forgot, or got confused about, the presence of a train include:
