Glaser's research focuses on international relations theory and international security policy. He has contributed to the ideas of defensive realism, the security dilemma, the offense-defense balance, and arms races through various publications and articles. In Rational Theory of International Politics, he outlines three factors that affect a state's security strategies: the material capabilities of a state, the information it has about the intentions and capabilities of other states, and the state's motives. Here, he distinguishes between motives that are "security-seeking" or "greedy." In a 2019 article for International Security, Glaser argued that the concept of a "liberal international order" was flawed and that many of the outcomes purportedly explained by the liberal international order could be better accounted for by defensive realism. Glaser received a doctorate from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He also holds an M.A. in physics and an MPP from Harvard University, as well as a B.S. in physics from MIT. Glaser was the Emmett Dedmon professor of public policy and acting dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago prior to George Washington University. He has also taught political science at the University of Michigan and was a visiting fellow at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. He has served as a strategic analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, and was a peace fellow at the United States Institute of Peace, as well as a research associate at the Center for International Studies at MIT.
Selected publications
Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation ; William C. Wohlforth of Dartmouth College said that the book is "destined to be one of the most important books on international relations theory."
Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy
"Why unipolarity doesn't matter," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, v24 n2 : 135-147
"Counterforce Revisited: Assessing the Nuclear Posture Review's New Missions," International Security, v30 n2 : 84-126
"When Are Arms Races Dangerous? Rational versus Suboptimal Arming," International Security, v28 n4 : 44-84
“The Security Dilemma Revisited.” World Politics Vol. 50, No. 01 （October 1997） pp. 171–201.
Charles L. Glaser and Chairn Kaufmann, “What is the offense-defense balance and how can we measure it?.” International Security Vol. 22, No. 4, （Spring 1998） pp. 44–82.
"Political consequences of military strategy: Expanding and refining the spiral and deterrence models." World politics 44, no. 04 : 497–538.
“Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-help." International security Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter, （1994-1995）:50-90
